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promise position between a noncompensable regulation on the one hand, and a
complete, traditional taking on the other56
Unquestionably, Pewee has raised significant and perplexing problems. In-
deed, it has recently been called "the most important labor case of the year
.. ,"57 (emphasis supplied). Speculation about possible solutions aside, the prob-
lems certainly merit more detailed consideration than the rather cursory glances
bestowed upon them in Pewee.
VERTICAL FORESTALLING UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS
Monopolies and restraints of trade have traditionally been thought of in
terms of horizontal market power. A recent increase in the number of cases in-
volving exclusive dealing arrangements, resale price maintenance, boycotting
practices, tie-ins, certain forms of agency agreements and vertical integration
has pointed up the necessity of defining the extent of vertical control per-
missible under the Sherman,' Clayton2 and Federal Trade Commission Acts.3
A strong argument can be made that these forms of vertical forestalling4 can
have adverse effects on free competition only when used as a method of exploit-
ing horizontal monopoly power. The Supreme Court appears to have accepted
this argument with respect to vertical integration in recent cases holding that
vertical integration is not per se illegal. However, the use of intent and con-
spiracy doctrines in the integration cases seems to have extended the area of the
illegality despite the rejection of a per se rule.
With respect to looser forms of vertical forestalling, the cases state an even
broader prohibition. Resale price maintenance is clearly illegal per se, and
group boycotts may also fall within the "per se" category. In the field of exclu-
sive supply and tying contracts, the courts have also established broad rules
of illegality although a flat ban has not been reached. The cases applying these
broad rules have, however, generally involved horizontal market power suf-
s6 For a discussion of the differences between a regulation and a taking, see Governmental
Seizure of a Business to Prevent Strike Caused Work Stoppages-Regulation or Taking, ig
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 184 (i95o).
s7 Frank, The United States Supreme Court: i95o-5r, xg Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 165, 167
(1952).
' 26 Stat. 209 (18go), as amended, i 5 U.S.C.A. § x et seq. ('g5i).
38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, i 5 U.S.C.A. § 12 et seq. (i95i).
3 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, z5 U.S.C.A. § 41 et seq. (i95i).
4 For the purposes of this comment, the phrase "vertical forestalling" will be used as a
generic phrase covering vertical control in all its forms ranging from outright vertical inte-
gration on the one extreme to exclusive dealing contracts and resale price maintenance on the
other. At common law, "forestalling" referred to the exclusion of goods or traders from a
market. Schueller, The New Antitrust Illegality Per Se: Forestalling and Patent Misuse,
50 Col. L. Rev. 170, 176-79 (ig5o). With the exception of resale price maintenance, these
forms of vertical control involve the exclusion of outsiders from a certain market. Hence,
he phrase "vertical forestalling."
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ficient to hamper free competition even though not illegal under the antitrust
laws as they are presently applied. Possibly, then, the scope of these rules may
indicate a desire to circumvent "[n]iggardly interpretations [which] have
robbed [the antitrust laws] of much of their efficacy" s rather than a desire to
ban vertical forestalling as such. Having refused to outlaw horizontal monopoly
except in its extreme forms, the courts appear willing to outlaw vertical control
as a method of exploiting and expanding monopoly in the broader, economic
sense.6 This thesis may be illustrated by intensive treatment of the vertical
integration cases coupled with brief comments on the other methods of vertical
control.
I
Prior to 194o vertical integration had been condemned under the Sherman
Act only where found to be an integral part of horizontal monopoly or where
used as a means of extending horizontal control to new levels. It had the blessing
of justice Holmes, who felt that the integration of successive stages of produc-
tion should not be condemned even when combined with an intent to monopo-
lize.7 In United States v. Int'l Harvester Co.,8 the courts found unlawful horizon-
tal monopoly but did nothing about the vertical control present. Such integra-
tion was approved as inevitable and desirable in United States v. United States
s Douglas, J., "dissenting" in Standard Oil Co. (Calif.) v. United States, 337 U.S. 293,
316 (1949).
6 As used in this comment "monopoly" designates that degree of market power necessary
to affect market price. The term "illegal monopoly" will denote that degree of monopoly
power prerequisite to the existence of a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
7 United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202, 218 (i913). Cf. United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32 (x918).
S214 Fed. 987 (D.C. Minn., 1914), 10 F. 2d 827 (D.C. Minn., 1926), aff'd 274 U.S. 693
(1927). In the complaint, petition in Equity No. 624 (D.C. Minn., 1912), the United States
had charged defendants with bringing together 85 per cent of the nation's harvesting ma-
chinery manufacturers with the purpose of monopolizing such machinery and also extending
their monopoly to other lines. Ibid., at 8-18. It was also charged that the original monopoly
was actually used to extend to new fields, such as tilling machiries and twine, ibid., at i8-3o,
that exclusive dealing contracts were used to entrench the monopoly power, ibid., at 19-21,
and that vertical extensions into lumber, steel and railroading were carried out with the intent
of furthering defendants' monopolistic purposes, Ibid., at 31-34. The prayer for relief was in
general terms, however, asking for a dissolution of the unlawful combination and an injunc-
tion against continuation of the unlawful practices. Ibid., at 42-44.
The decree, entered November 2, i918, at first commanded that International Harvester
be broken up into "three substantially equal... and independent corporations." It was later
amended so that defendants were forced to divest themselves of two of their "lines" of machin-
ery buf were left with the bulk of their business intact. The supplemental relief asked by the
United States, but denied by the Supreme Court, United States v. Int'l Harvester Co., 274
U.S. 693 (1927), also aimed only at horizontal dissolution. Thus there was at no time any
lessening of International Harvester's vertical control with the sole exception that it was
forbidden to have more than one agent in any one town or city. Steel, railroading, lumber,
twine, non-harvesting farm implement manufacturing and exclusive supplying agreements
were left untouched throughout despite the emphasis on vertical control in the complaint.
International Harvester at present still retains a vast amount of vertical integration. See
Moody's Industrials 164 (195).
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Steel Corp.9 In United States v. Eastman Kodak Co.,' 0 vertical integration by a
powerful monopoly, which had been using its control at the manufacturing and
raw materials levels to acquire control of other levels of trade, was disapproved
by the District Court;-' but vertical dissolution was not part of the relief ,I2 and
a later construction of the decree stated that Eastman Kodak might engage in
wholesaling and retailing where it did so "for the development of [its] business
... in good faith and not for the purpose of creating an unlawful monopoly."13
Dissolution of the illegal combination in United States v. American Tobacco
Co.'4 included only relatively unimportant vertical divestiture;'s and the more
extensive vertical dissolution granted in Standard Oil Co. (N.J.) v. United
States6 was, in the opinion of one acute observer, "more by accident than by
design."17
In United States v. Corn Products Refining Co.,'5 vertical integration by a
9 251 U.S. 417 (1920). See also Alexander Milburn Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,
1S F. 2d 678 (C.A. 4th, 1926); United States v. Keystone Watch Case Co., 218 Fed. 502,
$o8-$io (E.D. Pa., 1915). In the Steel case, the government's complaint had stated that the
threat of vertical integration by steel producers into the finished steel products field, and vice
versa, was the efficient cause of the original combination. Petition in Equity (D.C. N.J.,
1911) at 15-23. Vertical extension backward (e.g., to ore supplies) and forward (e.g., into tube,
wire, rod, nail and bridge manufacturing) was complained of. Ibid., at 24-37. The prayer for
relief asked for the separation of the individual corporations making up the combination,
which would have involved extensive vertical dissolution, and also asked specifically for can-
cellation of certain leases through which United States Steel controlled a large percentage of
the nation's iron ore supply. Ibid., at 67-69. Apparently the Justice Department's estimate
of the value of vertical integration was quite different than that of the Supreme Court.
"0 226 Fed. 62 (W.D. N.Y., 1915), 23o Fed. 522 (W.D. N.Y., 16), appeal dismissed 255
U.S. 578 (1921).
"T Ibid., 23o Fed. 522, 523.
12 The final decree, entered February 1, 1921 in the District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of New York, ordered Eastman to dispose of its Premo, Century-Folmer and Schwing
camera manufacturing plants, its Artura brand of photographic paper and its Seed, Stanley
and Standard brands of dry plates. It also forbade defendants from making exclusive supplying
contracts with their dealers. However, other methods of vertical control were permitted so
long as they were for a bona fide business purpose and there was no vertical dissolution.
13 Construction of the 1921 decree, entered January io, 1929.
'4 164 Fed. 700, .024 (S.D. N.Y., x9o8), rev'd 221 U.S. io6 (1911); x91 Fed. 371 (S.D.
NY., 1911).
's Licorice paste, cigar store and tin foil companies were cut off from the three main manu-
facturing concerns into which the American Tobacco Company was divided. United States
v. American Tobacco Co., 191 Fed. 371, 417-31 (S.D. N.Y., xgii). However, warehouses were
not so separated; and the individual defendants, who owned approximately 4o% of the voting
stock in each of the three principal successors to the Tobacco Trust, also owned between 34%
and 44% of such stock in the "separate" licorice, foil and cigar store companies. Ibid., at
415-x6.
16 221 U.S. I (Iii).
,7 Hale, Vertical Integration, 49 Col. L. Rev. 921, 924 (94).
'8 234 Fed. 964 (S.D. N.Y., x916). Defendant starch-glucose manufacturer went into the
candy business in order to threaten candy makers (who it felt were not giving it "sufficient"
business) with competition, ibid., at 982-84; and also attempted to monopolize the glucose
syrup business by raising its glucose price to other syrup manufacturers at the same time as it
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manufacturer with illegal horizontal power was denounced where used as a tool
in an attempt to monopolize new levels. Vertical divestiture was an important
part of the consent decree held valid in United-States v. Swift & Co.19 but that
case, like the Corn Products case, is restricted as precedent by the presence of
illegal horizontal power and the finding that the integration was for the purpose
of extending that power. In none of these early cases did the government attack
vertical integration as such. As the frequent failure to include extensive vertical
dissolution in the relief indicates, the attack was always on horizontal monopoly
with vertical integration being attacked indirectly and only where it served as
a method of extending horizontal power or was incident to such power.
Three of the Anthracite Cases, where defendant common carriers were split
off from their "captive" coal mining interests, represent the only direct attack
on vertical integration prior to J940.20 In all three cases, however, defendants
controlled large percentages of the total anthracite supply through their mine
and railroad holdings. Also, in the two cases involving the least amount of
market control,1 United States v. Lehigh Valley R. Co.22 and United States v.
Reading Co.,23 the Supreme Court emphasized the long histories of illegal
practices and evasions of the law, indicating that defendants were motivated
by a desire to stifle competition in the entire anthracite market. Furthermore,
the presence of specific statutory restrictions and the fact that defendants were
common carriers may limit these cases to their particular facts.24
lowered its syrup price thus "squeezing" non-integrated syrup manufacturers. Ibid., at ioo4-
1oo8. In 1934 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sustained a complaint against the
Aluminum Company of America in a treble damage suit based on a similar squeeze theory.
Baush Machine Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 72 F. 2d 236 (C.A. 2d, 1934).
19286 U.S. io6 (1932). Despite the fact that the original consent decree was entered in
1920, the last vertical divestiture was not completed by defendant Swift & Co. until 1942.
Consult 6 Toulmin, Anti-trust Laws § 28.24 (1951).
20 United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324 (1912); United States v. Reading Co., 253
U.S. 26 (1920); United States v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 254 U.S. 255 (1920).
21 In the first Reading case, defendants controlled 75% of the total United States anthra-
cite supply, United States v. Reading Co., 226 U.S. 324, 339 (1912); in Reading II 33%,
United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 53 (1920); and in the Lehigh case 20%, United
States v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 254 U.S. 255, 259 (1920).
-254 U.S. 255 (;920).
23 253 U.S. 26 (1920).
2 The long series of railroad merger cases, of which these cases are the culmination, have
been said to be "in a class by themselves" on the basis that they involve large, naturally
monopolistic public utilities whose activities must be more carefully watched than firms operat-
ing in a potentially competitive environment. Levi, The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly,
14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 153, 157 (1947). See Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 85 (1917). These
cases are also peculiar in that the vertical integration involved fell within the ban, not only of
the Sherman Act, but also of the "Commodities Clause" of the Interstate Commerce Act,
which forbids railroads to transport articles in which they have an interest. 34Stat. 585 (i9o6),
49 U.S.C.A. § i(S) (1929). See United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 6o-63 (1920); United
States v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 254 U.S. 255, 266, 270 (192o). The first Reading case arose
before the passage of the Commodities Clause.
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More recent decisions have followed the earlier pattern of condemning ver-
tical integration only where it was associated with some form of monopoly
power. In United States v. Pullman Co.,2s defendants, who had acquired a com-
plete monopoly of sleeping-car manufacturing and servicing in a "non-predatory
fashion," were held to have violated the Sherman Act because the court found
both an intent to monopolize and the exercise of exclusionary power by means
of exclusive dealing arrangements, staggered long-term contracts, and retention
of title to the cars with the requirement that railroads desiring to lease them
must also buy Pullman servicing for the leased cars. The District Court's in-
junction required defendants to sell Pullman cars to railroads desiring to operate
their own cars and to cancel the exclusive dealing and tie-in arrangements be-
tween Pullman and the railroads26 More important, Pullman was ordered to
divest itself of either the servicing or the manufacturing end of its business.27
Pullman chose to continue manufacturing and, with the approval of the Su-
preme Court, sold its servicing monopoly to a group represeniting ninety-five per
cent of American railroads. 2' Thus the case seems to say that vertical control,
legal when exercised by non-monopolistic units (assuming that the railroads are
not monopolistic, or at least that federal regulation prevents them from exercis-
ing monopoly power), is unlawful in the hands of an unregulated manufacturing
monopoly which though complete was not actually found to be in violation of
the antitrust laws.
In United States v. New York Great A & P Tea Co.,29 a criminal prosecution
under the Sherman Act, defendant grocery store chain was convicted of a
consummated conspiracy to monopolize and restrain trade. Affirming this con-
viction, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit referred to defendant's
"monopoly power,"n* but at the same time stated explicitly that defendant's
size and extensive vertical integration were not illegal by themselves.3' The gist
of the illegality seems to have been defendant's "abuse" of its power.32 The
abuses consisted mainly of the use of large size and extensive vertical integra-
tion to force price concessions from suppliers and to undercut competitors. 3
2s 5o F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa., 1943).
26 United States v. Pullman Co., 5o F. Supp. 123, 136-37 (E.D. Pa., 1943).
27 Ibid., and 53 F. Supp. go (E.D. Pa., i944).
29 United States v. Pullman Co., 64 F. Supp. roS (E.D. Pa., 1945-46), aff'd by an equally
divided court without opinion 330 U.S. 8o6 (z947).
29 67 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. Ill., 1946), aff'd 173 F. 2d 79 (C.A. 7th, 1949).
3 Ibid., 173 F. 2d 79, 88. The finding that defendant's boycotting practices were illegal,
ibid., at 87, is evidence of the courts thinking on this point. Unilateral boycotting is not
illegal unless the boycotter possesses dominant market power. See text and notes at notes
84-93 infra.
31' Ibid., 173 F. 2d 79, 82, 87 and 67 F. Supp. 626, 676.
32 Ibid., 173 F. 2d 79, 82, 87.
3 See Adelman, The A & P Case: A Study in Applied Economic Theory, 63 Q. J. Econ.
238 (i949).
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Some of the abuses, e.g., boycotting and "forcing" its suppliers to violate the
Robinson-PatmanAct,34.may have been illegal in and of themselves ;35 but others
such as price-cutting and operating at low profit margins, definitely were not.
All were illegal because they were part of a plan to abuse A & P's market power
by operating a "two-price" system (one for A & P and a higher one for com-
petitors) which had the inevitable effect of driving out competition.36 Thus the
A & P case involves intent as well as power. It stands for the condemnation of
vertical integration by a firm with great, although lawful, market power only
where such integration is used as part of a conspiracy to establish and maintain
a system that will drive out competitors.
In four recent decisions the Supreme Court has crystallized the rules banning
vertical integration connected with the acquisition or exercise of horizontal mo-
nopoly power and at the same time has stated that vertical integration would be
illegal even in certain cases where illegal monopoly power is absent. In United
States v. Yellow Cab Co.,37 the Checker Cab Manufacturing Corp. and its princi-
pal stockholder had acquired control of various Pittsburgh, Chicago, Minneapo-
lis and New York companies operating ioo%, 86%, 58% and i5%, respectively,
of the licensed cabs in those four cities.38 The government's complaint, charging,
inter alia, the formation of a conspiracy to exclude other cab manufacturers
from supplying defendants' operating companies, was dismissed by the Dis-
trict Court.39 In an opinion by Justice Murphy the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that if any "appreciable segment of interstate cab sales" had been pre-
empted as a result of the conspiracy charged, both Sections i and 2 of the
Sherman Act were violated.40 Supplying replacements for defendants' 5,oo0
cabs was sufficient to meet this test, irrespective of the "amount of interstate
commerce thus affected" or its "importance ... in relation to the entire amount
of that type of commerce in the United States."4' However, Yellow Cab could
not be cited as establishing the "per se" illegality of vertical integration.
Justice Murphy emphasized the government's charge that the "primary ob-
ject" of the defendants' conspiracy was the restraint of interstate trade and
that the integration was not "normal expansion to meet the demands of busi-
ness" but was "a calculated purchase for control," 42 all of which seems to re-
quire a finding of specific intent.
Although the Yellow Cab case apparently makes any vertical integration il-
legal provided a "specific intent" is involved, the end toward which the intent
34 49 Stat. 1526 (I936), I5 U.S.C.A. §§ 13, 2Ia (i95I).
3S United States v. New York Great A & P Tea Co., 173 F. 2d 79, 87-88 (C.A. 7th, 1949).
36 Ibid. Cf. Schine Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948), especially 119-20.
37 332 U.S. 218 (i947). 38 Ibid., at 221-24.
39 69 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Ill., 1946).
4Q United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 224-28 (1947).
41 Ibid., at 225-26. 42 Ibid., at 227-28.
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must be specifically directed was not adequately defined. Any vertical integra-
tion involves an intent to exclude competitors from the trade between the inte-
grating units. To make such intent to monopolize the trade inter se sufficient to
establish the illegality of vertical integration between parties without substan-
tial market control would, in effect, create a rule of per se illegality. Justice
Murphy's citation of authority, however, gives some indication that the intent
he referred to was an intent to achieve general market control in order to raise
prices rather than merely to monopolize the trade inter se.43
The "appreciable segment" test does not serve as a substitute for the require-
ment of horizontal monopoly power which appeared in the earlier vertical inte-
gration cases. The facts of the Yellow Cab case, as stated by the Court, indicate
that defendants held a monopoly position in at least two of the four cities where
they operated cabs;44 and in rejecting an argument that only nationwide re-
straints are illegal, Justice Murphy quotes language from Indiana Farmer's
Guide Co. v. Prairie Farmer Co.4S to the effect that the market need not be
nationwide if it has geographical or distributive significance.46 Arguably this
language requires a finding of horizontal market control before the integration
will be illegal. The opinion, however, ignores the market power of the local
cab operating companies. It is the national cab manufacturing market to which
the appreciable segment test is applied; and in the cab manufacturing field
CCM's small percentage of total production was only enough to avoid a de
minimis requirement.47 Justice Murphy relied on Section i authorities outlaw-
ing unreasonable restraints "regardless of the amount of commerce affected,"48
43 Most of the authorites cited by Justice Murphy in his vertical integration discussion are
Section i cases not at all smilar to the Yellow Cab case on their facts. See text and note at note
48 infra. In the crucial summary paragraph where the question of intent is brought in, Justice
Murphy refers, in two specific page citations, to a long series of combination cases most of
them involving railroad mergers. Since CCM was the sole continuous manufacturer of purpose
built cabs in the United States, United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 8o F. Supp. 936, 943 (N.D.
Ill., 1948), and since its local cab companies were (in three cases out of four) in a dominant
market postion, United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 221-24 (I947), there could
be some justification for analogizing the Yellow Cab integration to the illegal merger of semi-
monopolistic railroad systems. The two railroad cases referred to in which market control
was least (and therefore most similar to Yellow Cab's) were United States v. Reading Co.,
253 U.S. 26 (1920), and United States v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 254 U.S. 255 (1920), where the
Supreme Court emphasized the intent of the defendants to effect a general market restraint
in anthracite (going far beyond the intent merely to monopolize inter se). See text and notes
22-23 supra. That these two cases, with their intent emphasis, were important in Justice
Murphy's analysis is indicated by the fact that his definition of intent is quoted from the
Reading case. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1947).
44 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 224 (1947).
4s 293 U.S. 268, 279 (1934).
46 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 226 (1947).
47 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 69 F. Supp. 170, 174 (N.D. Ill., 1946). See subsequent
opinion at So F. Supp. 936, 941 (N.D. Ill., 1948).
41 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 225 (i947). Justice Murphy cited United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 31o U.S. ISO, 225 n. 59 (1940), and Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 485 (1940). On the page cited in the Socony opinion, Justice Douglas
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and apparently meant to equate the "any part" wording of Section 2 with this
mere jurisdictional limitation by subsuming both under the appreciable seg-
ment test.49 Hence, that test is a mere jurisdictional or de minimis requirement
and not a substitute for the horizontal power requirement of the earlier integra-
tion cases.
Like the integration cases prior to the Yellow Cab decision, United States v.
Paramount Pictures,5° involved the use of vertical integration by horizontal
monopolists at one level to extend their power to another, in this case a con-
spiracy of movie producer-distributors moving into the exhibition field. The
District Court felt that the essence of the illegality lay in the horizontal re-
straints and it failed to cut down defendants' vertical integration.S' Disagreeing
with this view and also with the government's contention that vertical integra-
tion was illegal per seS2 the Supreme Court set forth two tests for determining
the illegality of vertical integration to be considered on remand; such integra-
tion would be illegal (i) where it was motivated by a purpose to gain control of
an appreciable segment of interstate commerce rather than by normal business
needs, and (2) where it afforded, as part of a monopolistic undertaking, the
power to exclude competitors in a relevant market area, coupled with a purpose
to use that powerS3 The first of these tests was stated in words almost identical
with those of the Yellow Cab case,5 4 while the second follows the illegal mo-
nopoly integration cases previously discussed. The language offers no guidance
as to whether the intent must be in terms of exclusion (A & P) or raising prices
(Yellow Cab). The amount of horizontal monopoly power necessary for illegality
under the second test is apparently illegal monopoly power. On remand, the
District Court found that defendants' horizontal control had been "powerfully
aided" and extended to the exhibition level by vertical integration, and that
the integration was therefore illegal under Justice Douglas' second test, despite
the lack of any wrongful intent ss
makes a statement substantially equivalent to Justice Murphy's with respect to Section i,
citing in support Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1904), Steers v. United States 192
Fed. 1, 5 (C.A. 6th, 1911), and Patterson v. United States, 222 Fed. 599, 618-i9 (C.A. 6th,
x15). The Montague case involved market control within a definite geographical area, but
the Steers case (involving the produce of one farm) and the dictum from the Patterson case
(condemning the restraint as to a single interstate sale) clearly require no more than a minimal
amount of interstate commerce without reference to any geographical control. The Apex case
merely states the same conclusion and cites the same page of the Socony case in support.
49 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 225 (1947).
s' 334 U.S. 23X (1948). s' 66 F. Supp. 323 (S.D. N.Y., 1946).
s3 United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 13 i , 168-74 (1948).
S3 Ibid., at 174.
54 The only authorities cited in support of the first test are the Reading and Lehigh cases
relied upon by Justice Murphy in the Yellow Cab case. See note 43 supra.
ssThe court ordered all of defendants' theaters divested. 85 F. Supp. 88i, 893-95 (S.D.,
1949).
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In United States v. Columbia Steel Co.SS the government challenged the legal-
ity of United States Steel's acquisition of a western fabricating company, Con-
solidated Steel Corp. United States Steel's admitted purpose was "to assure a
market for plates and shapes produced at" its recently acquired plant in Geneva,
Utah.s7 Moving first under a Section i count, Justice Reed, speaking for a five-
member majority, stated that vertical integration was not a restraint illegal
per se under the Sherman Act.S8 Therefore, it must be shown to be unreasonable
if it is to be illegal; and to be unreasonable it must either be accompanied by an
unlawful specific intent as in the Yellow Cab case or else so unreasonably restrict
the opportunities of competitors to market their product that such intent can
be inferred.59 Outlining the factors that must be considered in a determination
of whether a particular "acquisition results in" an "unreasonable restraint"
from which intent may be inferred, Justice Reed stated that the court would
"look ... to the precentage of business controlled, the strength of the remain-
ing competition... the probable development of the industry, consumer de-
mands, and other characteristics of the market."6 ° Applying these tests to the
facts, he stated that the exclusion of United States Steel's competitors from
Consolidated's three per cent share of the market for rolled steel was not an
unreasonable restraint even though United States Steel had one-third to one-
half of the total rolled steel capacity in the western states.6 Nowhere does
Justice Reed discuss the possibility that U.S. Steel's fifty per cent market con-
trol represented an unlawful monopoly making vertical integration by it unlaw-
ful under the second Paramount test. It seems certain that he believed that in
certain market situations vertical integration could unreasonably restrain trade
even though not connected with illegal horizontal market power or the kind of
complete monopoly present in the Pullman case. Turning to specific intent,
Justice Reed, apparently believing that United States Steel's purpose was
limited to excluding competitors from the market inter se, found no specific
intent to impose an unreasonable restraint.2
s6334 U.S. 495 (1948).
s7 Ibid., at 506. s9 Ibid., at 522, 525.
s8 Ibid., at 521-23. 60 Ibid., at 527.
61 Ibid., at 5o5-6, 526-27. Mr. Justice Reed's interpretation of the facts is not without its
weak points. To get his estimate of Consolidated's share of the steel market he ignored the
difference between plates and shapes and the wider gauge rolled steel products (three-fourths
of Consolidated's business being in the former). Had he distinguished plates and shapes
from other rolled steel products, as did the four dissenters in the case, ibid., at 538, Con-
solidated's share of the Western market would have been i3% instead of 3%, ibid., at 5og,
a considerable difference in considering whether the effect on competition was one of unreason-
able restraint.
62bid., at 527. Certain factors in the Western steel market not brought to the Court's
attention might well have changed the result on the intent side had they been known. Kaiser's
Fontana, California, plates and shapes producing steel facilities were much closer to Con-
solidated's Los Angeles plant (the largest West Coast user of plates and shapes) than was
Geneva. The total California steel plates and shapes capacity was 478,750 tons of which
Fontana represented 3o9,ooo. American Iron & Steel Institute Directory of Iron & Steel
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Since there was no illegality under Section x, it followed, according to Justice
Reed, that there could be none under Section 2 unless an intent to monopolize
could be shown.6 Employing the same evidence to show the lack of illegal intent
under Sections i and 2, he stressed the long-continued decline in United States
Steel's total share of national production.4 Further, he stated that the govern-
ment-blessed purchase of Geneva, with an understanding that finishing facilities
to absorb its production would be erected, made the Consolidated purchase mere
normal business expansion (practically sanctioned in advance by the govern-
ment) rather than an attempt to circumvent the law. 6s
Pointing out that specific intent need not be shown where unreasonable re-
straint has resulted from the parties' joint action, the opinion of the four
dissenters is most concerned with what constitutes an unreasonable restraint,
not with the specific intent issue.6 The minority considered United States
Steel's horizontal market power too large and did not wish to see it extended
vertically. Their conclusion seems to be that vertical integration of an appreci-
able segment of an industry is unreasonable whenever one of the integrating
units has dominating market power. 67
The Supreme Court's second opinion in the Yellow Cab case68 established
that vertical integration not combined with unlawful horizontal monopoly can-
not be proved illegal on an intent basis unless there is a showing of specific intent
to do more than monopolize the market between the integrating units. Remand-
ed for trial on the merits, the case again went against the government in the trial
court.6 9 Proceeding without a jury, District judge LaBuy said that sound busi-
ness judgment rather than unlawful intent motivated CCM's integration with
the cab operating companies controlled by defendants.7* Economic explanations
for the activities of the defendants were considered by Judge LaBuy only as
Works of the United States and Canada 478-80 (25th ed., 1948). With the closest other plates
and shapes facilities being in Colorado, Texas and Washington, ibid., the Consolidated market
was of extreme importance to Kaiser and United States Steel. These facts were not presented
in the argument before the Supreme Court. Had they been presented, the Court's assumption
that United States Steel President Fairless' statement that the purchase was to "assure a
market for plates and shapes produced at Geneva," United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334
U.S. 495, 5o6 (1948), indicated a normal business purpose might have been open to question.
As it was, Fairless' statement comes perilously close to an admission that the purpose of United
States Steel's purchase was to exclude competition, particularly Kaiser, and therefore pos-
sibly wrongful. See text and notes at notes 14o-46 infra. Big Steel's purchase was followed
by Kaiser's erection of its own fabricating facilities, possibly because without Consolidated it
had no adequate markets. Had this been known, the intent question might have been resolved
differently.
63 Ibid., at 532.
64 Ibid., at 532-33. 66 Ibid., at 534-40.
6
s Ibid. 67 Ibid., at 539-40.
65 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338 (1949).
69 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 8o F. Supp. 936 (N.D. Ill., 1948).
70 Ibid., at 942-44.
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they related to the intent of the defendants and not as a basis for deciding
whether or not the restraints involved were unreasonable. As to the possibility
that the integration so restrained trade in the sale of cabs that intent might be
inferred, Judge LaBuy mentioned no further evidence and merely stated that
no such restriction existed especially since the operating companies were sub-
ject to strict regulation by the local municipalities.7' On appeal, the Supreme
Court affirmed on the basis of the failure to find unlawful intent.72
In dissent, Justice Black, joined by Justice Reed, asked how there could be
a judgment of dismissal where there had not been a full consideration of
whether the restraints were so unreasonable as to be unlawful regardless of in-
tent.73 The majority opinion, apparently regarding Judge LaBuy's curt dis-
missal of this point sufficient, is silent on this matter. Apparently the whole
Court agreed that the "monopoly" power resulting from CCM's position as the
sole continuous builder of "purpose built" cabs74 and the local monopolies of the
operating companies was insufficient to invoke the rule that vertical integra-
tion is unlawful where combined with horizontal monopoly.
Several factors present in the Yellow Cab situation might have placed CCM
in a position to "abuse" its vertical power.7S Vertical integration could have en-
abled CCM to evade municipal rate regulation of the local operating mo-
nopolies by inflating the rate base with overpriced cabs if it could convince the
local regulators (as it did the District Court76) that CCM "purpose built" cabs
were really different from converted stock cars and worth their extra price.
The temptation to act in this manner was increased by the fact 'that CCM
could thereby siphon any possible monopolyprofits to itself rather than leaving
them with partially owned operating companies 77 where they would be shared
with outsiders. If the government had been able to prove that CCM overpriced
its cabs for the reasons just suggested, it might have argued that the overpric-
ing was such an abuse of CCM's vertical control as to make that control unlaw-
ful under the Sherman Act. Nevertheless, the doubtful wisdom of using the
Sherman Act to protect minority stockholders or to remedy the shortcomings
of local public utility regulation may justify the Court's failure to consider these
factors.
In summary, it is clearly established that vertical integration will be illegal
71 Ibid., at 941, 944.
72 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338 (i949).
73 Ibid., at 342-44.
74 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 8o F. Supp. 936, 943 (N.D. Ill., 1948).
75 The fact that CCM sold the large majority of its cabs to its four operating companies,
rather than on the competitive market, indicates that its cabs may have been "overpriced,"
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 8o F. Supp. 936, 941 (N.D. Ill., 1948), a fact alleged and
accepted by the Court in the first case. Trans. Rec. at 12, 17, ibid., 332 U.S. 218 (1947);
ibid., 332 U.S. 218, 224-25.
76 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 8o F. Supp. 936, 943-44 (N.D. Ill., 1948).
77 Ibid., at 940.
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when used by the holder of illegal monopoly power at one level to squeeze
competitors at another level or to extend monopoly control to new levels. The
Columbia Steel case, foreshadowed by Pullman and A & P, states that vertical
integration can be illegal without the existence of illegal horizontal monopoly
provided it actually results in an unlawful market restraint or else is accom-
panied by a specific intent to restrain trade, but it rejects the notion of per se
illegality for vertical integration. The unreasonableness is to be measured in
terms of the effect of the integration on the opportunities of competitors in the
relevant market area, an analysis of the entire economic context of defendants'
actions thus becoming essential to a determination of illegality. The Yellow Cab
cases show that the specific intent required is not merely the intent to mo-
nopolize the trade inter se, but a broader intent, probably the intent to achieve
some general market control. With only three cases yet decided by the Supreme
Court in this area, two of them ultimately going against the government, it is
not yet possible to state the tests for the illegality of vertical integration with
greater precision or detail.
II
Most of the looser forms of vertical forestalling have been condemned in
language more broadly prohibitive than that employed in the vertical integra-
tion cases. An exception to this generalization appears in the agency cases.
Vertical control by means of agency agreements closely resembles actual inte-
gration both economically and legally.78 A manufacturer owning its outlets may
require them to deal with it exclusively and may set their resale prices. Similar-
ly exclusive dealing and resale price maintenance arrangements, often illegal
when concluded between independent enterprises,79 are normally lawful when
consummated between principal and agent.10
A possible exception to the rule that agency equals integration appears,
however, in the patent monopoly field. In United States v. General Electric Co.,",
the Supreme Court allowed the holder of a patent to exercise vertical control
over the wholesaling and retailing of its products, including the setting of resale
prices, by means of a "bona fide" agency arrangement. But the General Electric
case has been greatly restricted. In United States v. Masonite Corp.,'2 the Court
struck down a series of agency agreements executed by patent holding manu-
facturer where it appeared that the firms involved were integrated competitors
using the agency device as a guise for an industry-wide price fixing conspiracy.
The Masonite case may be made consonant with the vertical integration prece-
dents by interpreting it as involving a specific intent to control the market so
that it restricts agency agreements only to the extent that Yellow Cab restricts
78 Standard Oil Co. (Calif.) v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 310, 320 (1949).
79 See text and notes at notes 104-25 infra.
80 FTC v. Curtis Publishing Co., 26o U.S. 568 (1923) (exclusive agency contracts). See
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (resale price maintenance).
8' 272 U.S. 476 (1926). 82316 U.S. 265 (1942).
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vertical integration. A more severe limitation occurs in United States v. Line
Material Co. which specifically limits the General Electric case to single patentees
without regard to intent8s Thus sev~eral independent patent monopolists may
not combine to exercise the vertical control through agency agreements that
they could exercise separately.
Boycott cases involve vertical forestalling where the defendants have used
economic power on one level to coerce their competitors on other levels. In the
cases involving a concerted refusal to deal, defendants typically possessed domi-
nant market positions. There is language in Fashion Originators' Guild of Ameri-
ca v. FTC84 which can be interpreted as making a boycott by agreement illegal
per se,ss but in that case the defendants controlled sixty per cent of the industry.
"Monopoly power" was present in more attenuated form in Associated Press v.
United States, a more recent boycott case.8 6 That case, however, involved the
largest of the only three nationwide newsgathering agencies, the lack of whose
services was said by the opinion of the Supreme Court to be a definite competi-
tive disadvantage to any urban daily paper;7 hence it can hardly be said that
the defendants were without some monopoly power. In fact a boycott can hard-
ly have any significant effect apart from coercive market power, and, barring
certain non-economic motivation, can have utility only as a method for creating
or exploiting a monopoly position. 8
Where there is refusal to deal by a single trader only, the few cases in point
have held that illegality can follow only if that trader has dominant market
power.89 Perhaps the most attenuated application of this doctrine occurs in a
district court opinion, United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms.9° There, defend-
ant, the only domestic manufacturer of linen rug material, attempted to
monopolize, as against one of its own distributors, all sales to the federal govern-
13 333 U.S. 287 (1948). 84312 U.S. 457 (1941).
as See Kirkpatrick, Commercial Boycotts as Per Se Violations of the Sherman Act, io
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 302, 387 (1942). The Supreme Court, in United States v. Columbia Steel
Co. 334 U.S. 495, 522-23 (1948), stated that "where a complaint charges that the defendants
have... concertedly refused to deal with non-members of an association... such restraints
[are] illegal per se." But cf. United States v. Women's Sportswear Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949),
a case involving boycott activities carried on jointly by over one-half the stitchers of women's
sportswear in the Boston area. There the Supreme Court pointed to both the wrongful intent
and the restrictive effect of defendants' boycott in holding it to be in restraint of trade. Ibid.,
at 463.
86326 U.S. i (1945). 87 Ibid., at x3, 17-I8.
88 Those boycotted could, without disadvantage to themselves, trade with the competitors
of the boycotters unless the boycotters possessed some degree of market control. Moreover,
it is hard to imagine what purpose a boycott can have except as an exclusionary measure,
something not possible without considerable market power. See Chain-Store Integration as
Restraint of Trade Under the Sherman Act, z5 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 392, 393 (1948).89FTC v. Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565 (1924); Sorrentino v. Glen-Gery
Shale Brick Corp., 46 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Pa., 1942). Cf. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern
Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
9063 F. Supp. 32 (D.C. Minn., 1945).
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ment which bought one-third of the total output.91 The method used was first a
refusal to deal with the distributor who bid against it on a government contract
followed by demotion of the competing distributor to the status of a jobber
(with accordingly higher prices). This was held to be a violation of Section 2 of
the Sherman Act although there were product substitutes available and de-
fendant's one million dollar annual production was less than one-half of one per
cent of the total United States rug business. The Klearflax Company had ac-
quired its "monopoly" through normal business methods rather than through
predatory practices; and it existed "free from any wrongful domination, illegal
combination, or wrongful destruction of the business of other competitive manu-
facturers." 92 Very slight extension of the Klearflax case would establish that the
seller of trademarked items, or the seller of any product distinguishable by the
public from its closest competitors could not use boycotting tactics in an effort
to pre-empt any part of its market. However, the Klearflax holding may be
qualified by the existence of a conspiracy between Klearflax and its other
distributors93 which would make it a group boycott case. The cooperation of
these other distributors was necessary to the execution of Klearflax's plan so
that concert of action may have been a sine qua non of the illegality even
though the opinion does not specifically so state. Thus boycotts appear to be
illegal only when carried on by group action, or else by a single trader possessing
some market control, and even the group action cases have all involved mo-
nopoly power.
Another group of cases involving attempts to bring two or more stages of pro-
duction under a single control are "tie-in" cases under Section 3 of the Clayton
Act. Here, too, illegality has resulted only in involving monopoly power situa-
tions,94 although language in recent cases would support a flat per se rule.
Patentees attempting to force users of the patented article to use unpatented
products as well have been held to have violated the Sherman and Clayton
Acts, 95 and in a recent Supreme Court case so holding, Int'l Salt Co. v. United
States,96 the language would support a flat ban on all tying (and exclusive deal-
ing) agreements. Where no patent monopoly is involved, however, tie-ins have
9' Ibid., at 33-34- 9 Ibid. 9Ibid., at 34-40.
94 Stocking & Watkins, Monopoly and Free Enterprise 36o-63 (1951). According to these
authors, tying contracts do not oppress competitors in all circumstances. "Doubtless such
considerations influenced Congress in limiting the prohibition of... tying contracts to cir-
cumstances in which 'the effect... may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly.' In what circumstances 'may' the effect specified reasonably be antici-
pated? Though it would be difficult to frame a precise rule covering all cases, at least one con-
dition appears to be a prerequisite: possession by the seller of monopolistic power over one or
more of the products affected. An analysis of the cases supports this view." Ibid., at 361. Cf.
Standard Oil Co. (Calif.) v. United States, 337. U.S. 293, 306 (1949); Miller, Unfair Competi-
ti6n 194-2I3 (1941).
9s Int'l Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); United Shoe Mach.
Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
96332 U.S. 392 (1947).
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been condemned in practice only where they were imposed by defendants in a
powerful market position. In affirming the conviction of General Motors under
Section i of the Sherman Act for tying-in financing with the sale of cars, 97
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit emphasized the dominant market
position of the defendant. 98 However, in Signode Steel Strapping Co. v. FTC,99
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated that a maker of wire parcel-
wrapping machines could not tie-in the wire with the machines of its business
was substantial dollarwise regardless of its position in the relevant competitive
market. The significance of this dictum is attenuated by the fact that the Feder-
al Trade Commission order involved was one of three forbidding tie-ins by three
firms doing over two-thirds of the total United States wrapping-machine busi-
ness.oo Although this does not show Signode to have very great market power,
the Fourth Circuit held that the evidence justified the FTC finding that the
practices of these firms did substantially lessen competition. Furthermore, the
dictum in the case has never been applied where those accused were not in a
powerful market position,0 and in United States v. J. I. Case Co.,0- a district
court upheld the right of a large farm equipment company to require dealers
to handle its full line of machines as a condition for obtaining a dealership con-
tract. The court's consideration of tying is extremely brief and contains no
discussion of the precedents; but the holding is a clear indication that tie-ins are
not illegal, at least under the Clayton and Sherman Acts, in competitive situa-
tions where they are not the result of coercive practices.Y'3
97United States v. General Motors Corp., 12x F. 2d 376 (C.A. 7th, 194).
98 Ibid., at 403. 99 132 F. 2d 48, 54 (C.A. 4th, 1942). 10o Ibid., at 5o.
lot The leading non-patent tie-in case since SignodeisJudson L. Thompson Mfg. Co. v. FTC,
iso F. 2d 952 (C.A. ist, z945). Defendant leased riveting machines on condition that its
lessees use only defendant's rivets in the machines. Its leases covered one-third of the riveting
machines in operation in the United States and its sales of rivets represented twenty per cent of
the industry's sales. Ibid., at 953-54. Together with three other companies, defendant did
about two-thirds of the total United States business in rivets and rivet machines. Ibid., at'
954. The FTC's cease and desist order was upheld by the First Circuit on the bases that the
facts were not materially distinguishable from those in the Signode case. Ibid., at 958. Thus the
court avoided commenting on the Signode dictum. That monopolistic elements were clearly
present is shown in the court's statement that the tying clause gave defendant the power "to
compel a substantial proportion of the market to use its rivets," a condition hardly compatible
with effective competition. Ibid., at 958.
102 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 62,921 (D.C. Minn., 1951).
103 The facts of the case are markedly similar to the Signode case. Defendant Case was the
third largest "full line" farm equipment manufacturer, and tie-ins of the sort involved were
"the pattern of the industry." Ibid., at 64,8o8, 64,815. However, the court pointed out the
competitive nature of the industry and found that the tie-ins were the result of "mutual agree-
ments between the manufacturer and the dealers" rather than unilateral coercion by Case and
that prohibiting them "might tend to discourage competition rather than to stimulate it."
Ibid., at 64,814-15. See text and notes at notes 123-125 infra. Apparently District judge Nord-
bye felt that coercion, a mark of market control, was a prerequisite to the illegality of tie-ins.
In any case he did not believe in applying the broad language of the Signode case in all situa-
tions involving any substantial share of interstate commerce.
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Prior to the Miller-Tydings Amendment,"°4 resale price maintenance was a
form of vertical control that apparently was held illegal in all cases. However,
it is difficult to see how a manufacturer can sell a truly fungible, homogeneous
product above the going price in a competitive market; hence resale price
maintenance probably makes sense only where there is imperfect competition.
It has been strongly urged that resale price maintenance is only useful to its
originators in situations involving retail conspiracies, "brand name mo-
nopolies," or "signal-calling" by oligopolists."1s The earlier cases condemning
resale price maintenance support this view since they involve, without excep-
tion, market power in the form of copyrights and patents °6 or brand name mo-
nopolies.O7
Resale price maintenance has, of course, been partially legalized by the
Miller-Tydings Amendment with respect to branded products. The limitation
of the Amendment to branded products that are in competition with similar
goods and to vertical agreements not involving the combination of competitors
on any horizontal levell°s restricts the amount of monopoly power with which
vertical resale price control may be connected under the Amendment. However,
cases decided since the passage of the Amendment have condemned resale price
maintenance, not immunized by the Amendment, as a per se violation of the
Sherman Act."°9 Kiefer-Stewart v. Seagram & Sons"' finds a conspiracy to fix
maximum resale prices illegal even where no market power, restraining effect
or illegal specific intent was alleged or proved., However, the fact situation
104 5o Stat. 693 (1937), i. U.S.C.A. § i (1g5i).
.0s See The Per Se Illegality of Price-Fixing: Sans Power, Purpose or Effect, to be printed in
ig Univ. Chi. L. Rev. No. 4 (1952). The primary justification advanced in favor of resale price
maintenance has been that it protects a product's reputation, especially by preventing "loss
leader" selling. American Fair Trade Council, Resale Price Maintenance 3-6 (1942). However,
a manufacturer's reputation can hardly be damaged by low prices unless it is assumed that the
buying public is so irrational as to prefer higher priced goods in certain fields. See Resale Price
Maintenance and the Anti-Trust Laws, 18 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 369, 379 (xgS1) • Those damaged
by the loss leadership selling are the retailers who do not themselves engage in loss leading.
The resale price maintenance system is essentially a bargain between manufacturer and
retailer whereby the manufacturer agrees to maintain standard prices and a high mark-up in
return for the retailer's efforts in pushing his product while putting competitive items without
similar price maintenance "under the counter." Such a system could only exist on the assump-
tions (i) that each retailer has a monopoly position with respect to his own customers enabling
him to sell the high mark-up brands, and (2) that horizontal power on the part of all the re-
tailers will keep price cutters out of the retail field.
xo
6 E.g., Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (igo8); Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. I
(193); Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8 (igiS); United States v.
Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
X7 E.g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (igii); FTC v. Beech-
Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
Xo8 See United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945).
"o9 E.g., ibid.; United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); United
States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
" 182 F. 2d 228 (C.A. 7th, 1g5), rev'd 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
it See the trial court's instructions to the jury. Trans. Rec. at 267, Kiefer-Stewart v.
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (195I); The Per Se Illegality of Price-Fixing: Sans Power, Pur-
pose or Effect, to be printed in ig Univ. Chi. L. Rev. No. 4 (1952).
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underlying the Kiefer-Stewart case clearly involved monopoly power and it
does not, therefore, detract from the view that resale price maintenance will be
practiced only under conditions of imperfect competition."'
Another possible exception to the thesis that vertical forestalling can be con-
demned only in connection with monopoly power appears in the area of exclusive
supply contracts. Prior to 1948 such contracts had been condemned, in proceed-
ings arising primarily under Section 3 of the Clayton Act, only when pursued
by defendants dominant in the relevant market areas."13 However, in Standard
Oil Co. (Calif.) v. United States, this limitation was expressly removed by the
Supreme Court.y4 The opinion, by Justice Frankfurter, implied the removal of
the limitation with respect to tie-in contracts as well (thus tacitly approving
the dicta of the International Salt and Signode cases)."s The sole proviso was
that a "substantial" amount of interstate commerce be involved, a requirement
implying little more than a jurisdictional or "de minimis" requirement 6 similar
to the appreciable segment test in the integration cases.
The Standard Stations case, like the tie-in cases, can be distinguished from a
per se condemnation of vertical control as such. It was brought against a firm
during twenty-three per cent of the business in the relevant market area"7 in
an industry controlled largely by a few major suppliers whose collective (al-
though not collusive) use of these exclusive supplying contracts very probably,
in the view of Justice Frankfurter, had the effect of maintaining their dominant
position and deterring new entry into the industry."18 Two recent District
Court opinions indicate the lines along which limitations on the scope of the
Standard Stations holding may develop. United States v. Richfield Oil Corp."9
extends the holding of the Standard Stations case to Section i of the Sherman
Act and finds illegality in the requirements contracts of a oil company defend-
ant operating in the same area as Standard of California but not having the
economic power of that company. Still, Richfield is one of the major firms in
an industry dominated by large integrated firms2 ° who have recently been under
hIbid.
1 See Standard Oil Co. (Calif.) v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 300-304 (1949); Miller,
Unfair Competition 203-13 (1941).
"4 337 U.S. 293 (1949). "'s Ibid., at 304-305, 314.
"
6 There is no indication in the case that anything more than interstate movement plus
volume sufficient to be more than de minimis is necessary. Ibid., at 295-97, 314. See Int'l Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-96 (i947). Consult District Judge Yankwich's dis-
cussion of this point in the lower court. United States v. Standard Oil Co. (Calif.), 78 F. Supp.
85o, 866-67 (S.D. Calif., 1948).
"17 Standard Oil Co. (Calif.) v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 295 (1949).
1S Ibid., at 309.
"19 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Calif., i95i).
n. Richfield, sixty-two per cent of whose stock is owned by Cities Service and Sinclair,
Moody's Industrials 1874-75, I998 (ig$), is one of the West Coast's "Big Seven" (the others
besides Standard of California are Texaco, Shell, Tidewater Associated, General Petroleum
and Union Oil). Their combined production totals over two-thirds of the West Coast consump-
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attack by the government for joint violations of the Sherman and Clayton
Acts."'1 Moreover, the court speaks of Richfield's "coercive" tactics in main-
taining the exclusive supplying arrangements.-' The question of coercion was
further analyzed in United States v. J. I. Case Co." 3 Defendant Case Co. was
the third largest "full line" farm equipment manufacturer whose SIo7,ooo,ooo
gross represented 7% of the nation's total farm equipment business in 1948.124
One-third of Case's dealers handled only Case products although this was not
required by their dealership contracts."2s The government's bill, asking that
Case be enjoined from using exclusive dealing arrangements, was dismissed by
the district court. Distinguishing the Standard Stations case, the court found
that the exclusive dealing arrangements which existed were the result of mutual
agreement as to the best method of carrying on the business, that Case's policy
was against "coercing" dealers into accepting them, and that the farm equip-
ment business was highly competitive. Thus the difference in result between the
J. I. Case and Richfield cases seems to turn largely on the contrast between co-
ercion and mutual agreement dictated by sound business judgment. If the
presence of the power to coerce dealers into accepting exclusive dealing arrange-
ments is equivalent to some form of market control, these two cases are a
definite indication that exclusive dealing sans monopoly is not unlawful. In any
case, the J. I. Case holding is a refusal to treat Standard Stations as a flat per se
precedent.
In summary, most of the "loose" vertical forestalling cases are more stringent
than the vertical integration cases and there is even per se illegality, or some-
thing approaching it, in certain types of cases. Even in the agency situation,
which is most like vertical integration, there is doubt as to the legality of vertical
control by a patentee, the possessor of specifically sanctioned monopoly power.
Clearly a patentee may not exercise vertical control via agency arrangements if
those arrangements are the result of agreement between two patentees. In uni-
lateral boycott cases, the existence of monopoly power is a prerequisite to il-
legality; but it is not clear that the degree of monopoly power must be unlaw-
ful, as is required for in integration cases under the second Paramount test.
An even broader rule of illegality, approaching a flat per se ban, seems to be
developing in the group boycott cases. Such a per se rule might be explained on
tion of petroleum products and they all use exclusive supplying arrangements similar to Rich-
field's. Standard Oil Co. (Calif.) v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 295 (1949). Richfield's total
business in ig5o was over $4ooooooo, United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., g9 F. Supp. 28o,
285-86 (S.D. Calif., i95x), not too far short of the $66,oooooo total for Standard of California
in the Standard Stations case. Standard Oil Co. (Calif.) v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 295-96
(1949)-
12, Civil Action No. ii584-C (S.D. Calif., i95o). See CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 61,265.
-'United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280, 293-96 (S.D. Calif., igsi).
"3 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 62,921 (D.C. Minn., 1951).
"4 Ibid., at 64,808. "s Ibid.
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the basis that vertical forestalling was being condemned only where connected
with monopoly power since it is hard to see why group boycotting would ever
be complained of where the boycotters possessed no market power. Much the
same thing can be said about the per se rule developed in the resale price main-
tenance cases. There too the restraints in question seem to make little sense
unless exercised by those possessing significant market power.
The longest step toward per se illegality involving non-monopolistic situa-
tions has been taken in the tying and exclusive supplying cases arising primarily
under Section 3 of the Clayton Act. However, the J. I. Case decision indicates
that the sweeping prohibitions enunciated by the courts in the Standard Sta-
tions, Signode and Richfield cases may be limited to situations where the users
of vertical control possess coercive market power.
IlI
Concepts important in both "loose" and "close" vertical forestalling cases
were applied and expanded in a recent Seventh Circuit case, United States v.
Nat'l City Lines2 6 There both the trial and appellate courts followed recent
vertical integration precedent even though exclusive supplying contracts,
rather than integration, were under attack by the government. Defendants were
indicated under Sections i and 2 of the Sherman Act for conspiring to restrain
and monopolize the trade in tires, petroleum products and busses between the
city transit companies of operator defendants and the manufacturing companies
of supplier defendants. Operator-defendants, a group of interlocking holding
corporations for local transit companies, were treated primarily as a single group
in the case. Supplier-defendants were five largely non-competitive127 manu-
facturing corporations. The contractual arrangement consisted of a series of ten-
year requirements contracts and in connection therewith, a series of investment
contracts whereby the suppliers provided the operators with almost ten million
dollars for buying up local transit companies. Although the contracts were
negotiated separately, the suppliers were fully aware of each others' actions,
and were shown to have consulted together about the arrangements .12 A con-
viction under Section 2 of the Sherman Act was affirmed by the Seventh
Circuit.19
A requisite of the jury verdict in the City Lines case was a finding of specific
126 186 F. 2d 562 (C.A. 7th, 1951), cert. denied 341 U.S. 916 (ig5i).
=7 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., General Motors Corp., Phillips Petroleum Co., Mack
Manufacturing Corp., and Standard Oil Co. (Calif.). Mack and GM both made busses,
although of different types. Their "division" of the City Lines market was not carried out and
Mack dropped out of the plan three years before the indictment. Trans. Rec. at 569, 58i, 599-
6oi, 797-99, io62, United States v. Nat'l City Lines, i86 F. 2d 562 (C.A. 7th, ig5i). Phillips
and Standard Oil both sold petroleum products but were not in competition with each other
since they operated almost entirely in different areas and did not have contracts covering the
same City Lines subsidiaries. Ibid., at 883-84, I277-13'29; 1361-69, 1671-75.
129 United States v. Nat'l City Lines, z86 F. 2d 562, 570-71 (C.A. 7.th, ig5i).
2 Ibid.
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intent. Although extensive market power was present at the levels "inte-
grated, s13° the horizontal power was treated as lawful and issues relevant to the
second Paramount test were eliminated by the manner in which the indictment
was framed and b the jury's verdict. The first count of the indictment charged
defendants with conspiring to extend their ownership to new local transit corn-
panies.'13 However, the defendants were acquitted on this charge; and the
second count of the indictment, on which they were convicted, charged only a
conspiracy to monopolize the trade between suppliers and operators without
any allegation of present or attempted horizontal monopoly.13' As in the Yellow
Cab case, the possibility that vertical integration was being used to evade public
regulation of operator defendants' transit lines was not considered.33 Similarly,
exclusion of evidence eliminated the test of the Columbia Steel case as to whether
an unreasonable restraint actually resulted from defendants' activities.134 The
language of the trial judge in excluding this evidence'3s and his charge to the
jury 36 leave no doubt that specific intent to restrain and monopolize trade to
13oThe operating companies were mostly local transit monopolies regulated as public
utilities. On the supplier level, General Motors had previously been convicted as a single unit,
for exercising illegal vertical control in a case condemning its practice of tying in financing with
its cars, United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F. 2d 376 (C.A. 7th, 194x), and in that
case the Court of Appeals had emphasized the "dominant position" of General Motors "in
the automobile industry." Ibid., at 403. See text and notes at notes 97-98 supra.
"'1Trans. Rec. at 8-9, United States v. Nat'l City Lines, 186 F. 2d 562 (C.A. 7th, i9si).
3 Ibid., at 13-18. The government neither alleged nor proved any restraint or monopoli-
zation in any particular geographical or distributional market.
133In return for cheaper financing, the suppliers could have received higher prices for their
products paid for by the operators' consumers from funds made available under local regula-
tion because of the operators' inflated costs and rate bases. Operator defendants received
over $9,oooooo from the sale of stock, mostly preferred, to suppliers. Ibid., at 1445-48. In
previous financing arrangements, operator defendants had been forced to pay an underwriter's
fee of $325,000 to obtain $4,000,000 in financing, and at the time of the first deal with the
suppliers they had been unable to obtain other financing at all except at "prohibitive" prices.
Ibid., at 461-74. That City Lines was getting a bargain is indicated in the following quota-
tion from a letter by its counsel to Phillips, "You are buying the stock at $So a share, when the
market, which is very thin, is about $40 a share." Ibid., at 1234.
There was however, no conclusive evidence as to the reasonableness of operator de-
fendants' fares, rate bases or prices paid for supplies.
'34 bid., at 7o9-i6, 942-43, ioo8-ii. See Brief for Appellants at 31-34, 68, 84-89, ibid.
' s At one point District Judge Campbell explained his exclusionary rulings in the following
language, Trans. Rec. at 716, United States v. Nat'l City Lines, 186 F. 2d 562 (C.A. 7th,
ig5i): "[Wihere a complaint charges such an unreasonable restraint as the facts of the Yellow
Cab case show, the amount of interstate trade affected is immaterial in determining whether a
violation of the Sherman Act has been charged. A restraint may be unreasonable either because
a restraint otherwise reasonable is accompanied with a specific intent to accomplish a for-
bidden restraint, or because it falls within the class of restraints that are illegal per se. Now,
this case, on the charging part of the indictment falls within the first classification. The Gov-
ernment charges a specific intent to accomplish a forbidden restraint."
136 The following paragraphs were among the most important in the charge, ibid., at I 176-77:
"Likewise, if you find... that any two or more of the defendants ... with deliberate intent
agreed to monopolize that part of the interstate trade.., consisting of the sale of motor busses,
petroleum products, tires and tubes, used by local transportation systems which National,
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the detriment of competitors was a necessary prerequisite to any verdict of
guilty.
To find specific intent, it is necessary for the trier of fact to believe that the
defendants' acts were accompanied with a certain wrongful state of mind going
beyond the mere intent to commit the acts in question137 This requirement could
presumably be fulfilled by a showing that defendants consciously intended to
violate the statute.' 35 Defining specific intent solely in such terms would cripple
the antitrust laws. Conscious wrongdoing may not co-exist with the most ex-
treme form of economic restrictions, and intent to violate the law would be
extremely hard to prove even when present. The requirement of "willful wrong-
doing" has long been held inapplicable as a necessary test of illegality in the an-
titrust field.' 39 For the purposes of Sherman Act interpretation, specific intent
may better be defined in terms of the particular practices forbidden,14O and it is
in this second sense that it must be used in the vertical forestalling field. The
twin evils at which the antitrust laws are traditionally thought to be aimed are ex-
cluding competitors and tampering with prices. Vertical forestalling necessarily
American or Pacific owned, controlled, or had a substantial fl)aancial interest in, then you
may find such defendants guilty under Count II of the indictment....
"It is not unlawful to make a requirements contract, and it is not unlawful to make an in-
vestment of risk capital in the stock of a customer or potential customer for the purpose of
producing a new market, nor is such an investment illegal merely because it is made with
knowledge that other companies have made, or have been requested to make, similar invest-
ment, or with knowledge that negotiations are being carried on with other companies for such
investments. In order for you to find any of the defendants guilty of the charges in this in-
dictment, you must find that they participated in a conspiracy with specific intent to ac-
complish the single over-all unlawful purpose charged in the indictment ....
"In order to find such a specific intent [it] is necessary to find... that.., defendants
knowingly, willfully and deliberately intended to accomplish a forbidden restraint."
:37 Dangel, Criminal Law § 54 (i951); 1 Burdick, The Law of Crime § 120 (1946).
13' Many cases hold that where a statute makes it a crime to conspire to commit acts not
otherwise unlawful, criminal liability under that statute must rest on a finding of conscious
wrongdoing. See cases cited in i5 C.J.S., Conspiracy § 45 (i939); 3 Burdick, The Law of
Crime § oo1 (1946); May, Law of Crimes § 128 (4 th ed., Sears and Weihofen, 1938). At
present the prohibitions of the Sherman Act are broader than the old common law of restraints
and monopolizations; see United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 31o U.S. 150, 225, n. 59
(194o). Compare United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 40, 427-32 (C.A. 2d,
r944), with Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 221 U.S. i, 55-62 (19r1). And the Act covers
activities not themselves criminal, or even civil wrongs under any federal statutes. Rahl, Con-
spiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws, 44 Ill. L. Rev. 743, 744-45 (I95o). From this it is arguable
that conscious wrongdoing should be a necessary part of conspiracy cases under the Sherman
Act.
'139 See United States v. General Electric Co., 8o F. Supp. 98g, ioi6 (S.D. N.Y., 1948);
O'Halloran v. American Sea Green Slate Co., 207 Fed. 187, 189 (N.D. N.Y., 1913); United
States v. American Naval Stores Co., 172 Fed. 455, 461 (S.D. Ga., 19o9).
'40 In most crimes involving a specific intent, the intent requirement is explicitly stated as
an element in the crime and must simply be proved in the same manner as the other elements
of the crime in question. Clark & Marshall, The Law of Crimes § 49 (4 th ed., Kearney, i94o);
Miller, Handbook of Criminal Law § 17 (1934). Two difficulties arise under the Sherman Act.
Besides the conscious wrongdoing problem in conspiracy cases, see text and note at note
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involves an intent to exclude competitors from the trade inter se. Hence, a defini-
tion in terms of exclusion, as indicated in the A & P case, might easily confuse
intent to exclude inter se with the broader intent to exclude from the overall
market; and at one point in the charge to the jury in the City Lines case this
very confusion seems to have occurred.'4' The net effect of such confusion would
be to erect a per se rule by making the intent that accompanies any vertical
forestalling sufficient wrongful specific intent. A definition in terms of intent to
achieve overall market control in order to raise prices, as suggested by Yellow
Cab I, would be more in keeping with Columbia Steel's rejection of per se
illegality.
Adoption of a broader intent requirement would give defendants an oppor-
tunity to justify their integration on the ground that it produced greater ef-
138 supra, there is a problem created by the language of § i. Under § 2, it is unlawful to
"attempt... combine or conspire... to monopolize"; the object of any unlawful intent
is clear. But the § i wording is "contract, combination... or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade," not "contract, combination or conspiracy to restrain trade." The statute does not
define the intent involved in agreements in restraint of trade. The courts have not faced this
problem squarely. A comprehensive analysis of specific intent under § i is lacking. However,
in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 520-27 (1948), Justice Reed repeatedly
speaks of the "specific intent ... to accomplish an unreasonable restraint," indicating that
the Court will treat the statute as though it read "contract, combination or conspiracy to
restrain trade."
' 4See the first paragraph of the jury charge quoted in note 136 supra. Furthermore, the
discussion of authorities relied on to support the charge gives evidence that Judge Campbell
may possibly have felt that intent to exclude competition from the trade inter se was sufficient
(when coupled with conspiracy, see text and notes at notes 147-60 infra) to sustain a finding of
illegality. See Trans. Rec. at 1148-50, United States v. Nat'l City Lines, 186 F. 2d 562 (C.A.
7th, x95i). The argument from the cases and quotations relied upon apparently runs as
follows: The Sherman Act condemns all unreasonable restraints or monopolizations of inter-
state commerce no matter how small. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 226-27
(1947). Such restraints may be unreasonable either because they are unreasonable per se or
because they have an injurious effect on competition or because a specific intent is involved.
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522, 524 (1948). Where an exclusive con-
tract is involved the supplier gets a monopoly of the buyer's business. But only general intent
need be shown to prove an intent to monopolize. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
[The citation of the Griffith case and the following quotation relied on by the trial judge
indicate how important the notion of general intent in monopolization cases was in his charge:
"Section... 2 condemns the monopoly of 'any part' of trade or commerce.... Second...
'specific intent' is not necessary to establish a 'purpose or intent' to create a monopoly but...
the requisite 'purpose or intent' is present if monopoly results as a necessary consequence of
what was done.... [Mionopoly power, whether lawfully or unlawfully acquired, may violate
Section 2 of the Sherman Act though it remains unexercised ... for ... the existence of the
power 'to exclude competition when it is desired to do so' is itself a violation of Section 2,
provided it is coupled with the purpose or intent to exercise that power." United States v.
Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, I73 (1948).] There is in the City Lines case an agreement
which everyone intended to enter into and whose effects were an exclusion of competition
from some portion of interstate commerce. That agreement was a conspiracy under the Act.
From that the intent to monopolize which violates the Act can be inferred because its forma-
tion necessarily eliminated competition from the trade inter se so that intent to exclude
will be inferred. This reasoning clearly stumbles into the pitfall of confusing intent to monopo-
lize inter se with intent to monopolize the market, but the presence of many of the quotations
and citations used by Judge Campbell is difficult to explain on any other hypothesis.
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ficiency or prevented the growth of monopoly at the integrated level.' 42 It must
be remembered, however, that intent can generally be proved only by infer-
ence from defendants' activities rather than by direct proof.'43 In consequence,
a specific intent case (Yellow Cab II) is, practically speaking, not greatly differ-
ent from one involving the question of whether the restraints shown are so un-
lawful that intent may be inferred (Columbia Steel).'44 In both types of cases,
the borderline between legality and illegality cannot be easily and precisely
determined with the result that a great deal depends on the trier's findings of fact.
The position of the Court of Appeals in the City Lines case on the specific
intent issue is ambiguous. At one point, the court appears to adopt the position
that in executing requirements contracts the defendants "intentionally per-
formed acts which inevitably led to violation of Section 2 of the statute."' 45 The
violation which inevitably resulted, according to Circuit Judge Lindley, was
exclusion of "competitors from a market composed of the City Lines defendants
and their operating subsidiaries, present and future."Z46 As indicated above, this
would mean that requirements contracts are illegal per se since the parties to
them must intend to exclude competitors inter se. Such a conclusion would be
quite inconsistent with the court's citation of authority (although quite con-
sistent with the Standard Stations case) since neither Yellow Cab I nor Columbia
Steel depend on per se rules, the former requiring a broader intent and the latter
explicitly rejecting per se illegality in the vertical integration situation.
The discussion of intent may, however, be read as part of the court's analysis
of conspiracy. 47 Judge Lindley may have felt that the presence of conspiracy
made the finding of the broader specific intent unnecessary. By the tradi-
tional criminal law definition, conspiracy is an agreement to do an unlawful
142 A specific intent inference is ordinarily rebuttable so that defendants always have the
privilege of introducing evidence showing their freedom from wrongful intent. Clark and
Marshall, The Law of Crimes § 49 (4th ed., Kearney, 194o); Miller, Handbook of Criminal
Law of § 17 (1934). The limits on the background material that might be logically relevant
to such inquiries could be extremely broad. The fact that defendants are necessarily better
informed about their own activities than the government (or other plaintiff) will generally
give them an advantage in this type of case.
143 See United States v. McHugh, 253 Fed. 224, 228 (W.D. Wash., 'g17); i Burdick, The
Law of Crime 140 (1946); Dangel, Criminal Law 82 (i951).
144 The primary difference will be in the emphasis on personal motivation. For instance, in
the City Lines case the trial judge restricted the amount of evidence on the economic back-
ground which defendants were permitted to bring in on the theory that intent was the main
issue. See text and notes at notes 134 and 135 supra. At the same time the court allowed
the broadest sweep to evidence on the life history and personal motives of the principal indi-
vidual defendant. Trans. Rec. at 444-45, United States v. Nat'l City Lines, x86 F. 2d 562
(C.A. 7 th, 1951).
14S United States v. Nat'l City Lines, t86 F. 2d 562, 57r (C.A. 7th, xgs).
r46 Ibid.
X47 A major part of the opinion was devoted to the conspiracy question. Ibid., at 569-71.
The intent discussion occurs at the end of the conspiracy analysis, and it is not clear whether
intent is being considered as an element in the conspiracy or as a separate requirement.
Ibid., at 571.
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act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. 54 To be sufficiently "unlawful" to
form the basis of a conspiracy, the ends or means must either be known by the
conspirators to be unlawful or else so antisocial in nature that knowledge of
their illegality can be presumed. 149 Thus a finding of conspiracy normally sub-
sumes a finding of "corrupt" intent, s° and, by using this definition, Judge
Lindley would arguably be justified in holding that his conspiracy finding
brought the case within the intent requirements of Yellow Cab and Columbia
Steel.
However, conspiracy in the antitrust field is not used in the criminal law
sense. Originally all acts which would produce restraints or monopolizations of
trade may have been thought of as being so antisocial that any commission
thereof would justify an inference of wrongful specific intent.'1' That is no longer
14' Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. z97 (1893); Duplex Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S.
433 (1921); 3 Burdick, The Law of Crime §§ 984, 994 (1946).
r49 Criminal Conspiracy: Specific Intent as an Element of the Crime, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 96
(1924). Clark and Marshall, TheLaw of Crimes § 126 (4 th ed., Kearney, i 94o).Therehas been
much dispute about this definition of "unlawfulness" in conspiracy. In the case of statutory
prohibitions like the Sherman Act which make it criminal to conspire to commit acts not other-
wise unlawful, the tendency is toward stricter requirements. In fact, some cases would require
actual conscious wrongdoing. See discussion in note 138 supra.
.50 The joint object of the conspirators should be distinguished from the individual intent
of each conspirator to become a party to the agreement. Harno, Intent in Criminal Con-
spiracy, 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 624, 631 (i941). It is the joint intent that must be corrupt, general
criminal intent presumably sufficing for the individual intent to join. See The Conspiracy
Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crime or Protection of Individual Defendants, 62 Harv. L.
Rev. 276, 28o-8i (1948). Prof. Burdick states that where the object of a conspiracy is criminal
the general criminal intent that can be inferred from the doing of the acts in question is all
that need be shown even for the joint intent. 3 Burdick, The Law of Crime § iooi (1946). But
where, as in the antitrust field, the object is not criminal in and of itself the vast majority of
cases hold that "corrupt intent" is prerequisite to the existence of a conspiracy. Hamo, supra.
is, The following quotation illustrates the attitude of many of those who debated the Sher-
man Act in Congress. "When Robin Hood undertook to rob his fellow citizens he took his
life in his hand and with at least some sort of courage took the consequences of his crimes, but
these modem foot-pads have not the grace of his courage, but commit their robberies by
stealth." Sen. James Jones, opening debate on Sen. Sherman's bill in the second session of
the 5oth Congress. 20 Cong. Rec. 1458 (I889). It was not the hot heads who carried the day,
however. Under the guidance of Sen. Hoar, the second House-Senate Conference Committee
turned the bill into a restatement of the common law rules against monopoly and restraint of
trade, albeit with much more drastic remedies attached. Hamilton and Till, Antitrust in
Action,UnitedStatesTemporaryNat'lEconomic Committee,MonographNo. 16 at5-I i (1940).
Even Sen. Sherman, who felt that his original bill was declarative of the common law,
spoke of the combinations at which it was aimed as "monsters,"governed by the "law of selfish-
ness," who exercised "a kingly prerogative,inconsistent with our form of government," and who
"should be punished as criminals." 21 Cong. Rec. 2456-62 (i89o). Chief Justice White, also
interpreting the Sherman Act in the light of the common law, thought that restraints of trade
became unlawful only when they were so unreasonable as to "give rise to the presumption of
an intent to injure others" or "to do wrong to the general public." Standard Oil Co. (N.J.) v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 52, 58 (1ii), and he emphasized the presence of wrongful intent
in his analysis of the facts in the Standard Oil case. Ibid., at 75-77- For other early cases
emphasizing the wrongful motives or methods of Sherman Act defendants consult: Swift &
Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (19o5); United States v. American Naval Stores Co.,
172 Fed. 455, 458-59 (S.D. Ga., 19o9).
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true. Now the line between legality and illegality is recognized as being a
difficult one to draw,' s 2 and violators are not as often thought of in the moralistic
terms of an earlier period.s3 The failure to apply the more stringent criminal
penalties provided in the Sherman Act, viz., heavy personal fines and jail
sentences, is perhaps the best indication of this shift in attitude.s4 Neverthe-
less, when a court decides that certain joint activities result in restraints or
monopolizations it will find an unlawful conspiracy without much consideration
of the intent involved. General intent to commit the acts in question suffices.' s
Conspiracy is defined merely in terms of agreement, and even the definition of
agreement has been considerably attenuated so that the phrase "concert of
action" probably defines the present antitrust definition of conspiracy fairly
'52 Hamilton and Till, op. cit. supra note xis (passim).
-s "Nor is the legality of the combination complained of to be determined by innocence of
motives; the prohibition of the statute may not be evaded by good intentions. The legislation
is declarative of economic policy, violation of which is deemed detrimental to common welfare,
irrespective of motive or other wrongful intent." Prairie Farmer Pub. Co. v. Indiana Farmer's
G. Pub. Co., 88 F. 2d 979, 982 (C.A. 7 th, 1937). "[E]very defendant... was aware of the plan,
consciously participated in it, and must be held to have violated the law.... [Usually a viola-
tion of the Sherman Act is not an ordinary crime. Violation is ordinarily an economic offense,
the seriousness of which is not related to the moral turpitude of the offender." United States
v. New York Great A & P Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626, 679 (N.D. Ill., 1946). See United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 429-32 (C.A. 2d, I944); Hearings on Sen. Res. 41
before the Senate Committee on Civil Service 625-68, especially 629, 664-65, 8oth Cong. ist
Sess. (1947) (Testimony of Wendell Berge).
's4 See Hamilton and Till, op. cit. supra note I5, at 78-8I, 121-25.
ss In United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 543 (1913), the Court stated: "[We] regard it
as altogether plain that by its necessary operation [the conspiracy] would directly and ma-
terially impede and burden the due course of trade and commerce among the states.... And
that there is no allegation of a specific intent to restrain such trade or commerce does not make
against this conclusion, for, as is shown by prior decisions of this court, the conspirators must
be held to have intended the necessary and direct consequences of their acts and cannot be
heard to say the contrary." Similar language may be found in other Section i cases. See, e.g.,
United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 275 (1942); United States v. General
Motors Corp., 121 F. 2d 376, 4o6 (C.A. 7th, 1941). A similar tendency to disregard specific
intent is to be found in Section 2 cases. See United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. IOO, 105 (X948);
United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 173 (1948). Such disregard has even
been combined with repeated emphasis on conspiracy as an essential basis of the illegality.
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
An authority on the criminal law has outlined the factors normally present when a legisla-
ture erects criminalpenalties for certain behavior regardless of the mental element involved."In
statutory crime.., it is frequently unnecessary to show more than that the accused com-
mitted the act forbidden by the statute.... [Tihe legislature tends to create such offenses
where (i) the penalty incurred is not great, but (2) the damage caused to the public by the
offense is in comparison with the penalty, very great; and where (3) the offense is such that
there would be peculiar difficulty in obtaining adequate evidence of the ordinary mens rea."
Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law 44 (I5th ed., Phillips, 1936). The latter two of these factors,
if not always the first, are present in the antitrust field with respect to showing corrupt intent
in conspiracy cases. Perhaps the courts feel that the presence of these factors justifies reducing
the intent requirement in Sherman Act conspiracies to a requirement merely of general criminal
intent just as the same factors justify the dropping of even the general intent requirement
elsewhere. Cf. The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crime or Protection of Indi-
vidual Defendants, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 276, 281 (1948).
Z952] COMMENTS
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
accurately."s6 Under the Sherman Act, express agreement need not be shown;"57
and action by individuals with the knowledge that others are participating in
a plan the success of which depends on joint action is conspiratorial."51 Some
cases have even been interpreted as showing a trend toward holding that the
parallel action of oligopolistic firms too large to ignore each other's actions is an
illegal conspiracy."59 This emphasis on the "agreement" aspect of conspiracy in
current antitrust cases makes it impossible for a conspiracy finding to supply
any specific intent requirement. In fact, as the preceding paragraph shows,
judge Lindley's own discussion of intent requires no more than the intent to
monopolize inter se which is present in all vertical forestalling cases.' 6° Thus if
the presence of conspiracy is a sufficient support for the holding in the City
Lines case, the specific intent requirement has, in effect, been washed out and
replaced by concert of action as a basis of vertical forestalling illegality.
The handling of intent and conspiracy in the City Lines case is, then, a long
step toward per se illegality for all vertical forestalling. The analysis of intent
could lead directly to a per se rule. Even assuming that the conspiracy finding is
essential,' the flat ban may not be far removed. As already noted, conspiracy
s6 See e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394 (948); Ameri-
can Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F. 2d 93, 107 (C.A. 6th, i944). Nor is the tendency to
use a broad definition of agreement in conspiracy actions confined to the antitrust field. Con-
sult Cousens, Agreement as an Element in Conspiracy, 23 Va. L. Rev. 898 (1937).
is7 United States v. Masonite Corp., 3.6 U.S. 265 (1942); Eastern States Lumber Ass'n v.
United States, 234 U.S. 6oo (1914).
,SS Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (939).
"S9 E.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948); American Tobacco
Co. v. United States, 147 F. 2d 93 (C.A. 6th, 1944), aff'd 328 U.S. 781 (946). In these cases a
large amount of the evidence consisted of showing parallel actions by supposed competitors,
and some commentators have argued that they are precedent for the statement that proof of
control of an industry by an alleged conspiracy together with proof of the non-competitive
(viz., parallel) behavior of the conspirators is sufficient evidence of a Sherman Act violation.
Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 567,
586-87 (947); Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 6x Harv. L. Rev. 1289,
1324-27 (1948). However, there was considerable evidence of actual agreement in the Tobacco
and Paramount cases and the Adelman-Rostow position is far from being universally accepted.
Johnson and Stevens, Monopoly or Monopolization-A Reply to Prof. Rostow, 44 I11. L. Rev.
269, 292-96 (I949); Dession, The Trial of Economic and Technological Issues of Fact: I, 58
Yale L.J. 1019 (1949).
16o See text and notes at notes 145 and 146 supra.
ft The importance of the conspiracy issue in Judge Campbell's view of the case is indi-
cated by the following quotation from the charge to the jury, Trans. Rec. at x75-76, United
States v. Nat'l City Lines, 186 F. 2d 562 (C.A. 7th, 195):
"The essence of the crime charged ... is the illegal agreement, conspiracy, and combina-
tion.... [T]he crime of which the defendants are charged is committed when and if the agree-
ment to achieve the illegal purposes charged in each Count is reached, and it is immaterial
whether or not the agreement is later carried out. The success or failure of the combination or
conspiracy charged in each Count of the indictment is likewise immaterial ... if you find
beyond a reasonable doubt that any two or more of the defendants entered into the con-
spiracy or combination as charged in these Counts of the indictment....
"However, the making of an investment of each supplier defendant in the preferred and
common stock of National, American and Pacific, was not in itself unlawful, nor was the
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as used in the antitrust field means only concert of action; its intent side has
been dropped.1612 Thus, stating that a conspiracy to forestall vertically is un-
lawful, although vertical forestalling without more is permissible, is to say that
vertical forestalling is all right done unilaterally but may not be done by joint
action.' 63 Such a rule would parallel other areas of antitrust law doctrine in
which the single trader may do what the "loose combination" may not.A64 In
fact, the Sherman Act is worded largely in terms of joint action,'6 s probably for
the reason that its framers thought of restraints of trade primarily in terms of
group activities.'6 Penalizing groups for doing what a single individual may
lawfully do has been justified because of the increased power flowing from joint
action, the added determination each conspirator receives from knowing that
he has the support of confederates, and the increased contemporary importance
of organized forms of crime.'6 7 Suspicion of group action in the economic sphere
execution of the several supplier requirements contracts in itself unlawful, whether or not
made in connection with the investment ... unless you further find, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that such investments and sales contracts were a part of, or resulted from a con-
spiracy among the defendants or some two or more of them to effect a forbidden restraint
in commerce in motor busses, petroleum products, tires and tubes."
,62 The loose use of conspiracy in the antitrust field has created a threat of dangerous ex-
tensions of criminal liability in other fields. See Justice Jackson concurring in Krulewitch v.
United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445, 451-52 (1949); The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecution of
Group Crime or Protection of Individual Defendants, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 276, 281-82 (1948).
163 A rule against joint vertical control where such control exercised unilaterally is per-
missible already exists in the patent-agency field. See text and note at note 83 supra. The
same thing will be true of boycotting if a flat per se rule develops for group boycotts while
unilateral boycotts remain illegal only when pursued by concerns with market dominating
power. See text and notes at notes 84-93 supra.
x64Perhaps the most graphic example is the contrast between certain Section 2 monopoly
cases, e.g., United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (192o), and the trade
association cases, e.g., American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (N921).
United States Steel could fix prices and set production quotas for the one-half of the nation's
steel producing facilities owned by it; but suggestions of future prices and production limita-
tions by the American Hardwood Manufacturer's Association to its members (producers of
one-third of the nation's hardwood) was unlawful. See Jaffe and Tobriner, The Legality of
Price Fixing Agreements, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1164 (1932).
,6s The means enumerated in Section i for accomplishing unlawful restraints (contracts,
combinations and conspiracies) all require the action of more than one person; and it was more
than fifty years after the passage of the Act before any single firm was found to be illegal under
the "monopolization" wording of Section 2. Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws, 44 111.
L. Rev. 743, 747-48 (i950).
166 Ibid., at 744-48. In the words of Chief Justice White, the primary evil toward the eradi-
cation of which the Sherman Act was aimed was "the enormous development of corporate
organization, the facility for combination which such organizations afforded, the fact that
the facility was being used and that combinations known as trusts were being multiplied.. .. "
Standard Oil Co. (N.J.) v. United States, 221 U.S. z, 50 (rg11). White felt that monopoliza-
tion by an individual was not one of the matters covered by the Act. Ibid., at 55-62.
167 Miller, Handbook of Criminal Law § 32 (r934); The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecution
of Group Crime or Protection of Individual Defendants, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 276, 283-84 (1948);
Criminal Conspiracy: Bearing of Overt Acts upon the Nature of the Crime, 37 Harv. L. Rev.
1121, 1123 (1924).
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is at least as old as Adam Smith's famous remark to the effect that "People of
the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to
raise prices."' 68 Apparently the feeling is that supposedly independent com-
petitors should act independently, and that when they do not, but instead come
together to affect trade conditions, a purpose and a power to restrain or mo-
nopolize trade will be presumed even though the joint activities in question are
not clear restraints or monopolizations on their face. Such a presumption may
be justified where those combining are direct competitors. In the City Lines
case, however, there was no agreement among competitors since the supplier
defendants were not in competition with each other and the operator defend-
ants were treated as a single unit. The presumption of unlawfulpower and
purpose is considerably attenuated although perhaps still justified with respect
to such a "conspiracy."' 6 9 But the City Lines case goes further still. The charge
to the jury called for the finding of a conspiracy if any two or more of the de-
fendants agreed to set up exclusive supplying arrangements. 70 That could
mean one supplier and one operator defendant. Such a definition would mean
that all vertical forestalling by agreement between two independent firms is
conspiratorial. Moreover, since conspiracy may be found within a single firm,'7x
vertical integration or single trader boycotts could also be the result of a "con-
spiracy." In these situations, neither the original "intent" basis nor the anti-
trust "combination of competitors" basis for making conspiracy the foundation
of illegality exists. But these attenuated uses of conspiracy are current in anti-
trust cases, as the rationale of the concept appears to be forgotten, so that
possible conspiracy limitations of the City Lines case may be largely meaning-
less.
In summary, vertical forestalling is clearly illegal when combined with un-
lawful monopoly power. Some of the "loose" forms of vertical control are ap-
parently illegal per se, and others may be illegal even though connected with
monopoly power not unlawful under the antitrust laws as now interpreted. If
the City Lines case is not restricted to its facts (as it could be since it is in a
field of per se illegality under the Standard Stations case) the use of intent and
conspiracy may greatly broaden the areas of per se illegality, especially in the
"close" vertical forestalling area. Although the courts have not as yet applied
z68 Quoted in Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 Harv. L. Rev.
1289, 1322 (1948).
"69 See United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 311 (1948).
170 See the paragraphs of the charge quoted in note i6i supra.
X7' No antitrust case to date has found a conspiracy within a single, unitary corporation;
but corporations have been held to have conspired with their wholly owned subsidiaries and
dicta indicate that the day of single corporation conspiracies may not be far off. Kramer, Con-
certed Action Between a Corporation and its Officers-A Violation of the Sherman Act?
ii Fed. Bar J. 130 (1951); Are Two or More Persons Necessary to Have a Conspiracy Under
Section i of the Sherman Act?, 43 Ill. L. Rev. 551 (1948).
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these broad rules in situations not involving monopoly power, there is as yet no
indication of what the limits of illegality will be in the vertical forestalling
field.172 Prerequisite to both an evaluation and prognosis of the trend of vertical
forestalling rules is an analysis of its economic consequences.
IV
Vertical control without more has little if any adverse effect on free competi-
tion."73 In fact, the extension of vertical control can have strong monopoly-
17'The "appreciable segment" test will apparently not serve as a significant limit. The City
Lines case fully supports the previous interpretation of the appreciable segment test as a
mere jurisdictional or "de minimis" requirement probably synonymous with the "sub-
stantial share" test of the "loose" vertical forestalling cases. Suppier-defendants argued that
they did not come within the scope of the test since they were charged only with monopolizing
the trade of one customer, and they urged that the test required the finding of a restraint or
monopolization having geographical or distributive significance. Reply Brief for Appellants
at i5-3o, United States v. Nat'l City Lines, 186 F. 2d 562 (C.A. 7th, 195r). There was joinder
on this point as the government interpreted the test to mean only that a substantial volume
of trade was involved. Brief for the Appellee at 28-30. Relying on the Yellow Cab case, the
Court of Appeals specifically rejected defendants' theory, thus impliedly approving the gov-
ernment's argument. Ibid., 186 F. 2d 562, 566-68.
73 Stocking and Watkins, Monopoly and Free Enterprise 298-99, 314-3o, 36o-6I (195i);
Edwards, Maintaining Competition 98, 176-77 (1949); Miller, Unfair Competition 194-2I3
(1941); Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 27 (I949); Hale, Vertical
Integration, 49 Col. L. Rev. 921 (1949), and authorities cited.
A more difficult question is presented in gauging the efficiency of various types of vertical
control, especially vertical integration. Vertical integration may be inefficient because it en-
tails planned exchanges not subject to market checks, because of the increased complexities
in management it necessitates, because the optimum size of plants may be different on the
separate levels integrated, because shifts in technology make formerly efficient patterns of
integration unworkable, and because vertically integrated firms are slow in their adjustment
to technological changes. Stigler, The Theory of Price 210 (1949); Wallace, Market Control in
the Aluminum Industry 177-79 (1937); Burns, The Decline of Competition 431-33,436 (i936);
Dennison, Vertical Integration and the Iron and Steel Industry, 49 Econ. J. 244, 249-54 (1939);
Jewkes, Factors in Industrial Integration, 44 Q. J. Econ. 621, 626-29, 635-37 (1930); Laving-
ton, Technical Influences on Vertical Integration, 7 Economica 27, 29-30 (x927). Resale price
maintenance can create inefficiency in distribution by depriving low-cost distributors of the
advantage of their superior efficiency, and also, on the manufacturing level by fostering trivial
differentiation of products and irrational choice of goods by consumers, Stocking and Watkins,
supra, at 330.
But vertical integration can also be a means for greater efficiency. In many cases there are
technological savings from operating successive stages of production together. Or, vertical
integration may promote cheaper production because integrated firms have less overhead
per unit of output (especially since intracorporate selling and advertising expenses are elimi-
nated), have a steadier flow of materials better attuned to their own particular needs, have
access to cheaper investment capital due to their greater size and stability, and are able to
locate plants most advantageously. Wallace, supra, at 182-88; Burns, supra, at 433-34;
Adelman, The A & P Case: A Study in Applied Economic Theory, 63 Q. J. Econ. 238, 247
(949); Frank, The Significance of Industrial Integration, 33 J. Pol. Econ. 179 (1925). Simi-
larly, requirement contracts may protect against price fluctuations, assure supplies, avoid
storage costs, save selling expenses and make financing easier. Stockhausen, The Commercial
and Anti-Trust Aspects of Term Requirements Contracts, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 412 (1948).
Whatever the relative importance of these various factors, a careful weighing of them is not
central to antitrust analysis. Competition is the arbiter of efficiency. The purpose of the anti-
trust laws is to provide a framework in which effective competition may operate, not to pre-
judge the verdict of the market place as to the relative merits of varying modes of production.
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lessening results in situations where one level of an industry is monopolized and
others are not. In such situations the competitive firms, not wanting to pay
monopoly prices and desiring to share in monopoly profits, will extend their
operations to the monopoly level so that the horizontal monopoly control is
weakened.74 Various arguments against this position have been advanced. The
"double profit" argument-to the effect that vertically integrated firms can
undersell their competitors because they derive profits from several levels
rather than just one' 7 -has long been thoroughly discredited.176 Another com-
plaint against vertical control is that it cuts off the one-level firms from access
to raw materials and markets. It is argued that in boom times vertically inte-
grated firms have easier access to scarce raw materials than their non-integrated
rivals, and similarly that the assured outlets of the integrated unit will be
valuable assets in a depression. However, both of these advantages will obtain
only where the integrated firms control a disproportionate share of the outlets
and suppliers, because, if they do not, the non-integrated outlets and suppliers
will serve the non-integrated manufacturers to the same extent that the inte-
grated firms serve themselves. Moreover, even if the integrated firms do control
a disproportionate share of outlets and suppliers, in boom times non-integrated
firms can dispose of all their goods without the trouble and expense of main-
taining a selling organization which will lose money during bad times; and dur-
ing a depression, only the non-integrated firms will be in a position to take
full advantage of the over-supply of raw materials. 77 Thus the advantages and
disadvantages of vertical control in having outlets and suppliers assured will
probably largely cancel out as against the single level firm."78
174 Burns, The Decline of Competition 421-23 (1936); Stockhausen, The Commercial and
Antitrust Aspects of Term Requirements Contracts, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 412, 426-27 (1948);
Stigler, The Extent and Bases of Monopoly, 32 Amer. Econ. Rev., Supp. No. 2, at I, 22 (1942);
Jewkes, Factors in Industrial Integration, 44 QJ. Econ. 621, 629-30 (1930).
'75 See Frank, The Significance of Industrial Integration, 33 J. Pol. Econ. 179, 190 (1925).
176 The integrated firm must obtain a reasonable return on each level of production in
order to justify its investment. Any advantage it derives from being able to forego profits on
prior levels of production in order to undersell competition at the final selling stage will
mean an abnomally low rate of return on its total investment. Integrated firms might be
able to stand such a low rate of return, but, if so, it would only be because of factors not re-
lated to vertical integration such as undistributed surpluses from former years, derivation of
monopoly profits elsewhere or size large enough to withstand temporary losses. Burns, The
Decline of Competition 437-38 (1936); MacGregor, Industrial Combination 97-98 (19o6);
Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 27 (1949). Cf. Thorp, The
Integration of Industrial Operation 255-58 (1924); Willoughby, The Integration of Industry
in the United States, i6 Q. J. Econ. 94, 112 (igoi). But cf. Stigler, The Theory of Price 2o9
(I949)-
177 See Jewkes, Factors in Industrial Integration, 44 Q. J. Econ. 62X, 631-33 (1930). But
see Dennison, Vertical Integration and the Iron and Steel Industry, 49 Econ. Jour. 244, 255-56
('939).
178 Stigler, The Theory of Price 210 (1949); Hale, Vertical Integration, 49 Col. L. Rev.
921, 947 (1r949).
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A more telling argument against vertical control is that vertical forestalling
restricts the possibilities for entry of new firms since more capital is required to
enter an industry with large integrated units than one where each level of
production is separate. 79 This argument does not apply to industries where
only small percentages of the firms are integrated, but where an important
number of firms in an industry integrate vertically the markets open to com-
petitors are reduced, and the tendency is to force everyone to integrate. 8°
Therefore, vertical forestalling may increase the amount of capital required for
entry in a given industry. However, if an industry offers opportunities for good
profits and there is no artificial scarcity of investment capital this difficulty hard-
ly seems a justification for condemning all vertical control.
The tendency of the courts, especially in the integration cases, to condemn
vertical forestalling more easily in connection with all forms of monopoly rests
on a sound economic basis. In combination with horizontal power, vertical
forestalling provides a method of exploiting and extending horizontal monopoly
power. On the exploitation side, many monopolists can achieve the greater
monopoly profits due to price discrimination",' by vertical forestalling. Where
demand for a monopolized article varies directly with the frequency of use of
another product the monopolist can charge more to the customers with the
greater demand by tying in the unmonopolized product with the monopolized
article and charging a high price for the former.' 82 This may be the only way
certain monopolists can exact monopoly profits. Suppose a monopolist controls
a product used extensively by a few buyers who will pay more than numerous
buyers who use the product less frequently. If the cost conditions are such that
total cost will approximately equal total revenue whether the monopolist pro-
duces a few units selling at the high price or the many units at the low price
(due to the economies of scale), then large scale production combined with tie-in
price discrimination will provide the only means of achieving monopoly
profits'5 3 Similarly, a single producer of a product having several uses with
varying demand conditions for each may find vertical integration the only
means available for price discriminating so as to take full advantage of the
differing demands.5 4 A kind of price discrimination may be an explanation of
179 Miller, Unfair Competition 212 (1941). Cf. Vertical Integration in Aluminum: A Bar
to "Effective Competition," 6o Yale L.J. 294, 301-5 (195').
180 Hale, Vertical Integration, 49 Col. L. Rev. 921, 949 (1949).
18z Stigler, The Theory of Price 223-27 (1949).
182 Cf. Judson L. Thomson Mfg. Co. v. FTC, i5o F. 2d 952, 954 (C.A. Ist, 1945).
r33 Cf. B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 498 (1942)-
184 Where A has a monopoly of product P which is made into products X and Y, if the pro-
ducers of X can afford to pay more for P than can the producers of Y, A will want to price
discriminate. However, this may not be possible as long as the producers of Y can sell to the
producers of X. But if A takes over the production of Y it can then discriminate by charging
a low price to itself as the producer of Y and a higher price to the producers of X without fear
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the "squeeze" behavior of some integrated monopolies.SS In all these situations,
however, horizontal power is the basic evil, vertical control being only a method
for fully exploiting the monopoly power. Nevertheless outlawing vertical con-
trol may make it difficult for the monopolist to exact any significant monopoly
profit. And where the monopoly power exploited is either publicly sanctioned
as in the case of patents, or too small to fall within the present interpretation
of Section 2, a prohibition against vertical forestalling provides one of the few
restraints which may be imposed on the exercise of such power.8 6
A second general area of monopoly exploitation via vertical forestalling
occurs in the field of publicly sanctioned monopolies.5 7 Public utilities having
monopolies on two or more levels may use vertical agreements to avoid the full
impact of rate regulation where the different levels are under the jurisdiction of
of cross sales. Even where cross sales are not a problem, a manufacturer operating under con-
ditions of imperfect competition may be prohibited from price discrimination by the Robinson-
Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 13, 2Ia (1951), or the recent cases outlawing
basing point systems, Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. v. FTC, i68 F. 2d 175 (C.A. 7th, x948),
aff'd by an equally divided court sub nom. Clayton Mark & Co. v. FTC, 336 U.S. 956 (1949);
FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948). Integration with the buyers from which the
higher prices can be obtained provides a method of continuing the discrimination in such
situations. Cf. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948)-
195 Suppose P is the sole producer of raw material X and has a subsidiary S which, together
with firms T and U, has monopoly control of the manufacturing of the products into which X
is manufactured. In setting its price to S, T and U, P will equalize marginal revenue with
marginal cost and its price will include a monopoly profit for itself. Similarly, when deciding
at what price S is to sell, P will want to equalize S's marginal revenue with its marginal cost.
But the marginal cost of X as far as P and S are concerned will not be the price set for sales to
the entire S-T-U market since P is charging a monopoly price. Therefore, S's marginal cost
will be less than that of T and U and S's sale price will be less than that at which T and U
would normally expect to sell because of the lower cost figure used by S. Thus P's actions in
setting prices as any monopolist normally would will have the effect of "squeezing" T and U
even though P is not consciously attempting to drive T and U out of business, but only trying
to maximize profits.
z86 In the patent field, the Supreme Court has exhibited a strong tendency to limit the
methods by which a legally sanctioned monopoly may be exploited through the use of vertical
control devices, such as resale price maintenance and tying contracts. Schuller, The New
Antitrust Illegality Per Se: Forestalling and Patent Misuse, 5o Col. L. Rev. 170, 184-95
(295o); Patent Abuses and Antitrust: The Per Se Rule, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 626 (ig5i). The Court
has referred to these techniques of vertical control in terms of extension rather than exploita-
tion of the patent monopoly. See Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, 339 U.S.
827, 832, 837-39 (i95o); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., .320 U.S. 66i, 666 (z944);
Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co., 246 U.S. 8, 23 (1918). In this comment such
techniques are referred to as "exploitation," with the word "extension" being reserved for
situations where the monopolist uses his power to achieve monopoly on a second level. The
strong language in United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489-90 (I926), sup-
porting a patentee's right to use any "normal and reasonable" methods for securing his full
"pecuniary reward," may explain the Court's preference for the use of the world "exten-
sion" rather than "exploitation" in cases limiting the scope of the patent grant.
187 See Edwards, Maintaining Competition 97-98 (I949); Adeiman, Integration and Anti-
trust Policy, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 27, 43-44 (i949); Hale, Vertical Integration, 49 Col. L. Rev.
921, 938-39 (1949).
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different regulatory bodies or some levels are not regulated at all. The practical
difficulties inherent in allocating costs between the various levels of an inte-
grated enterprise'88 make the task of the regulatory body extremely difficult
even assuming that it can bring together the records of the company from every
level' 8 9 Where only one level is fully monopolized, as in the Yellow Cab case,
the regulators could obtain competitive comparisons on cost figures, but where
both consumer and supplier are monopolies, this check is lacking; and a rule
banning vertical forestalling in such situations might well be justified.190
The reasons for the use of vertical forestalling to extend monopoly power in
situations not affording increased efficiency or the benefits of price discrimina-
tion are less important and the dangers to a competitive economy from such use
of vertical forestalling are not as great. In certain situations there can be no
doubt that vertical control may be used to extend monopoly power, primarily
where such control is used as a defense against monopoly at the integrated
level. Where a monopoly (or a competitive firm as previously explained) on one
level is confronted with actual monopoly on a second level, there will be a
tendency to use vertical forestalling to avoid paying high prices to the mo-
nopolists on the second level.19' In that situation, the vertical forestalling tends
to break down monopoly on the second level unless the first monopolist
achieves monopoly power on both levels. Even if a two-level monopoly is
eventually achieved, the deterrent to new competitors presented by the
necessity of making a larger initial investment in order to begin competing may
be offset by the fact that the double monopoly will probably tend to have a
lower price and greater production than if the two levels were separately
owned.' 92 In these situations, then, the net effect is to bring two monopolistic
levels under joint control, a result which will normally not raise prices or in-
crease the total power of the monopoly in the economy.
In a limited number of situations, horizontal monopolists might also desire to
extend their vertical control for reasons other than as a defense against other
monopolies. A monopolist may desire to expand his sphere of control in order to
insulate himself by pushing prospective competitors farther afield and forcing
M Adelman, op. cit. supra note 187, at 30-31; Hale, op. cit. supra note 187, at 941-45. This
difficulty also obtains for the integrated enterprise, of course, making it hard for any such
enterprise to know how much it actually benefits (or loses) from being integrated.
x89 Edwards, Maintaining Competition 99, n. 12 (1949).
Igo Cf. ibid., at 129-30, 177.
'9' Even the fear of future development of monopoly on the second level could be sufficient
reason for a monopolist to integrate. Such fears might be especially strong in any area where
the importance of patents could make future monopolies on other levels extremely powerful.
19 Where a single monopolist controls two levels of an industry, when he decides that a
decrease in price will increase his total revenue, he will immediately lower the price and pass
the decrease long to the public. But where the two levels are separated, one monopolist will
hesitate to decrease his price in any circumstances because he cannot be sure what action will
be taken by the other monopolist (who may simply absorb the price reduction for his own
benefit and not pass it along). See Marshall, Industry and Trade 420 (4 th ed., 1923).
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them to make a larger initial investment in order to compete. This reason may
be of increased significance where there is a possibility that patent development
might solidify the newly acquired levels.'93 Barring the existence of possible
new patent monopolies or restrictions in the supply of capital, it is difficult to
understand how a monopolist could greatly enhance his power to stifle new.
competition by means of such vertical extension. The vertical extension would
bring increased size, but whatever antitrust problems are raised by size alone
are not aggravated because they are a product of vertical forestalling. More
effective control of horizontal monopoly (and size) would render vertical ex-
tension in these situations harmless and would in fact remove the main reason
for such extension, namely the desire to obtain protection against other hori-
zontal monopolies.
V
In the light of this economic analysis it becomes possible to appraise the
courts' handling of vertical forestalling. Where connected with illegal monopoly,
vertical forestalling is clearly illegal whether it involves monopolization of new
levels, actual or attempted, or is only "closely related" to the original illegal
horizontal combination and a "definite means" of carrying it out. 94 In these
situations, the courts have not analyzed the extent to which vertical forestalling
injures the competitive structure. Cases where the expansion may be a means
of exploitation or an attempt to bolster the original unlawful monopoly are not
distinguished from cases where the expansion is an attempt to break down
monopoly on other levels or merely an investment of surplus funds giving no
added leverage other than that which results from increased size. One reason
for this may be that under current relief notions the "fruits" as well as the
"tools" of illegal monopoly power may be dissevered,9S Thus even economically
harmless vertical forestalling may be cut off or enjoined if it was acquired as a
result of the exercise of unlawful monopoly power.
A few cases indicate that there is a limit past which the courts will not go.
If the vertical control is clearly carried on for technological efficiency or as an
innocent investment and has no connection with the illegal monopoly power,
it may survive the dissolution of the monopoly.'9 6 The net result is that a find-
'93 Cf. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918). -
194 United States v. Paramount Pictures, 85 F. Supp. 88i, 893-94 (S.D. N.Y., i949).
19S United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 189 (1944); Schine Theatres
v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128-29 (1948); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334
U.S. 131, 152-53 (1948).
196 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (C.A. 2d, i945), 9 F. Supp.
333 (S.D. N.Y., 195o).
In the Paramount case, Justice Douglas states that some vertical integration entered into
merely as "innocent investments" is permissible. "If in such cases the acquisition was not
improperly used in furtherance of the conspiracy, its retention by defendants would be justified
absent a finding that no monopoly resulted. And in those instances permission might be given
the defendants to acquire the interests of the independents on a showing by them.., that
neither monopoly nor unreasonable restraint of trade.. . would result." United States v.
Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 153 (1948).
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ing of illegal horizontal monopoly may make most vertical control unlawful with
the burden being on the monopolist to show that the vertical control had no
connection with the illegal monopoly if such control is not to be condemned.
Where vertical forestalling is attacked in situations involving lawful mo-
nopoly power under the antitrust laws as presently interpreted, more difficult
problems arise. There may still be monopoly power sufficient to be more fully
exploited or even extended by means of vertical forestalling. The fact that there
will be no possibility of attacking vertical forestalling as a "tool" or "fruit" of
illegal monopoly makes a direct attack on the vertical control necessary if it is
to be removed; and the removal is, if anything, more important than in the case
of illegal monopoly because of the impossibility of direct attack on the monopoly
itself. But, following the economic analysis previously presented, the rules
banning vertical forestalling must not be so broad as to ban such forestalling
where it is not connected with monopoly power of any sort.
Traditional analysis of restraints and monopolizations of trade have been in
terms of illegal power, purpose or effect. An "effect" analysis might look either
to the effect on prices or the effect on competitors. Where the vertical fore-
stalling is used as a price discrimination technique, it may not be too difficult
to show an effect on prices. However, in many situations, as the Yellow Cab
case shows, proof of effect on prices would be extremely difficult. The courts in
the vertical forestalling cases have taken the other approach to the effect prob-
lem and treated exclusion as the major effect to be expected from vertical fore-
stalling. Following the Columbia Steel case, the test of illegality in vertical fore-
stalling cases would be whether an unreasonable amount of competition had
been excluded. The determination of unreasonableness is often a long, difficult
process whose results are uncertain, and, as Columbia Steel indicates, unlikely
to result in banning vertical forestalling in all monopolistic situations.
Reliance on the "purpose" aspect of the traditional trichotomy is likely to
prove equally unproductive. The City Lines case shows how easily the intent
analysis may degenerate into an overly broad per se rule. On the other hand,
if intent is restricted to the broader definition intimated in Yellow Cab I, the
same difficulty of proof arises as with the "reasonableness of effect" test. De-
fendants will be permitted to justify their actions as intended to affect only a
small part of the market, thus raising the same economic issues that would
have to be resolved by the trier on the rule of reason analysis. The only differ-
ence would be an extra step in the reasoning process. Instead of weighing the
many economic variables in terms of their market effect, the trier would con-
sider them as factors bearing on the intent of the defendants. Once again the
result would be an extremely general rule, uncertain of application in a par-
ticular situation, leaving much to the factual determination of the trier, and
having no necessary relation to the question of the presence of monopoly which
should be the touchstone of any rule of illegality for vertical forestalling.
The most direct test for the illegality of vertical forestalling would be a power
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test: the forestalling would be illegal when connected with monopoly power,
in the economist's sense, but not otherwise. This test would, of course, require a
different definition of monopoly power than that used in current Sherman Act
cases. Judge Hand's "30-60-9 o " dictum'97 would have to be replaced for verti-
cal forestalling cases by his earlier suggestion that a monopolist is one whose size
relative to the market is such that he can affect price by a change in his out-
put.98 Such a test would entail difficult problems of application but it would
have the merit of putting the emphasis in vertical forestalling cases where it
properly belongs. The present vertical forestalling rules have reached results
equivalent to those which would be reached under this test in most cases. But
the notions of conspiracy, intent and per se illegality that operated to achieve
this are so broad that they set no proper limits on the scope of illegality other
than the unguided horse sense of prosecutors and triers of fact in antitrust cases.
The test suggested as a substitute for these several rules would not only intro-
duce proper limits, it would also unify them into a single rule covering all the
vertical forestalling situations. Per se illegality in fields, such as resale price
maintenance, group boycotts and patent tie-ins, where monopoly power uni-
versally co-exists with vertical control would be an economic corollary of the
"power" rule.,99
The present scattered rules concerning vertical forestalling could thus be
'97 United States. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 4i6, 424 (C.A. 2d, 1945).
198 United States v. Corn Products Refining Co., 234 Fed. 964, 102 (S.D. N.Y., 1916).
199 See text and notes at notes 88 and io5-i2 supra. A patent "is at least prima facie
evidence of [market] control.' Standard Oil Co. (Calif.) v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 307
(1949). There are few who will argue that the per se rule should be extended uniformly to all
vertical forestalling fields. In fact, such an extension would cause tremendous dislocation of
long established business practices that have little relation to monopolies or restraints of
trade and may increase efficiency. See note 1,.3 supra for a discussion of the possible ad-
vantages to be derived from exclusive supplying contracts and vertical integration. Agency
arrangements are enough like these two forms of vertical control so that the same reasoning
will apply to them.
Unilateral boycotting, viz., refusal to deal by a single competitor, has never been thought
to need justification in our system of free enterprise and can hardly be said to have adverse
economic consequences when engaged in by a single firm in a competitive market. Similarly,
tying arrangements are not bad when separated from monopoly power. See note 94 supra.
Few will object to tying laces in with the new pair of shoes; and the often beneficial exclusive
dealing contracts are in a sense tie-ins. (Each unit used during the operation of the contract is
"tied-in" with all the rest.) Where the tie-in is desirable from the purchaser's point of view or
where alternative combinations of products are close substitutes for the products in ques-
tion, the tie-ins will not have restrictive effects on competition. It is only where a competitive
product is tied-in with a monopolized product in situations where no alternative combination
is available that the tying has adverse economic effects as a method of price discrimination
by the monopolist. It has even been argued that the use of a tie-in is justifiable in the patent
monopoly situation to facilitate the best possible operation of the patented product. See
Int'l Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. z31, 134 (1936). However, this
argument does not bear close scrutiny. If the patented product operated better in con-
nection with the tied-in product of the patentee, as against the goods of other makers of the
tied-in product, the coercion of the tie-in would not be necessary. Ibid., at 138-39.
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greatly simplified. A broad condemnation of vertical forestalling where it is
employed to expend or exploit horizontal power capable of affecting market
price would encompass all situations in which vertical control has direct adverse
economic consequences. Such an interpretation actually harmonizes vertical
forestalling precedent while at the same time confining dangerously broad
language.
Perhaps the vertical forestalling cases are a symptom of unduly narrow in-
terpretations of the antitrust laws. The courts may be struggling to restrict the
monopolies they are unable to outlaw directly by denying them the opportunity
to grow through the use of vertical control. In only very rare situations will the
prohibition against vertical control effectively curb monopoly power. If and
when the antitrust laws are amended or reinterpreted so as to become effective
weapons against horizontal monopoly power, it is likely that the present broad
rules concerning vertical forestalling will fall into disuse and oblivion.
